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REALITY BITES: THE ILLUSION OF SCIENCE IN 
BITE-MARK EVIDENCE 
Erica Beecher-Monas* 
ABSTRACT 
 
More than a decade after Daubert, years after the amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, and long after the courts in Frye 
jurisdictions started examining the empirical basis for expert claims 
before permitting such testimony in their courtrooms, judges are still 
evading their gatekeeping duties when it comes to criminal cases.  A 
prime example of this can be found in bite-mark testimony.  Although it 
comes dressed in the illusion of science, having experts with advanced 
degrees, a fancy name (forensic odontology), professional associations, 
and professional journals, that illusion belies the reality that bite-mark 
evidence utterly lacks empirical support for its claims.  This Article 
examines the claims made for bite-mark testimony, and the empirical 
support for those claims.  It discusses the avoidance techniques used by 
the courts which permit this testimony into evidence despite the experts’ 
inability to provide empirical support.  It analyzes the threshold 
relevance requirement as basic to a rational system of adjudication, the 
concept of reliability as an inextricable component of this analysis, and 
why cross-examination, engine of truth though it may be, cannot resolve 
the problem of bogus expertise.  This matters, because the result of 
admitting such flawed testimony is not only an injustice to the 
individual; it also undermines the legitimacy of the justice system. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Accurate fact-finding is supposed to be the key to the structure of 
adjudication, whether in civil or criminal cases, with the ultimate goal 
of discovering the truth through a rational process.1  While trials may be 
 
 *  Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School.  With many thanks to Simon Cole 
and Susan Haack for their thoughtful comments. 
 1 Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of 
Reasoning by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 929 (1996) ( “[N]ormative order constituted by 
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imperfect mechanisms for achieving that goal, admitting bunkum into 
evidence cannot help. Nonsense masquerading as science has no place 
in being admitted into evidence to prove an issue disputed at trial. Half-
baked theories and expert ipse dixit without empirical support have no 
place in this process.  That is the basis for rules about the admissibility 
of expert evidence, including the Daubert2 decision, its progeny, and the 
ensuing amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence.3  It was also the 
basis for the Frye4 rule, although there the emphasis was entirely placed 
on general acceptance by the scientific community as a proxy for 
validity.5 
This goal of accuracy applies to both civil and criminal cases, and 
the same rules governing admissibility of expert testimony apply to both 
contexts.6  If anything, accurate fact-finding is even more important in 
criminal justice, because the legitimacy of the justice system depends on 
it.7  In practice, however, despite the common goal of accurate 
factfinding and the common threshold of relevance and reliability, 
judicial application of gate-keeping standards in civil and criminal trials 
could not be more different.8 
 
the legal system, informed by ‘rule of law’ principles as well as by many others, aspires to be 
rational in significant ways.”).  As philosopher and legal scholar Susan Haack explains, 
“intellectual integrity requires a willingness to seek out evidence, and assess it, honestly.”  Susan 
Haack, The Ideal of Intellectual Integrity, in Life and Literature, 36 NEW LITERARY HIST. 359, 
364 (2005).  There are other goals, of course, and sometimes policy considerations trump 
accuracy (spousal privilege rules, for example, which promote conjugal harmony at the expense 
of truth).  But no one contends that rules should promote false information.  Yet that is exactly 
what is being promulgated with bite-mark evidence. 
 2 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 3 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 4 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (excluding polygraph testimony in a 
criminal case). 
 5 For a discussion of the epistemological underpinnings of Frye and Daubert, and an 
explanation for the author’s preference of Daubert over Frye, see ERICA BEECHER-MONAS, 
EVALUATING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORK FOR INTELLECTUAL 
DUE PROCESS 4-16 (2007).  The point that I wish to make here, however, is that the courts are 
failing to engage in any analysis—neither Frye nor Daubert—when it comes to expert testimony 
in criminal cases. 
 6 An exception to this is Georgia, whose Supreme Court recently ruled that civil rules of 
evidence require reliability, but criminal rules do not.  See, e.g., Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., 
Inc., 658 S.E.2d 603, 607 (Ga. 2008) (ruling that the Georgia Tort Reform Act of 2005, which 
affected the admissibility of expert testimony in tort actions but not criminal cases, violated 
neither the U.S. nor the Georgia constitutions, holding that “for purposes of evidentiary 
standards . . . the parties to civil cases are not similarly situated to those engaged in criminal 
prosecutions”). The effect of this ruling is that in Georgia, expert evidence affecting life and 
liberty is subjected to a far less stringent standard than that affecting property interests. 
 7 LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL 
EPISTEMOLOGY 2 (2006) (“Public legitimacy, as much as justice, demands accuracy in 
verdicts.”). 
 8 See D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of 
Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99 (2000) (demonstrating that, in the post-
Daubert period studied, civil defendants won their reliability challenges to plaintiffs’ proffers 
most of the time, while criminal defendants virtually always lost their challenges to prosecution 
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In post-Daubert civil trials, judges routinely hold hearings to 
examine the scientific validity of expert testimony proffered in their 
courts, even in Frye jurisdictions.9  These judges have no compunction 
about excluding expert testimony that they deem shaky.10 But, in 
contrast to the routine and extensive challenges to expert testimony in 
civil cases, especially in toxic torts, the validity of expert testimony is 
rarely challenged in criminal cases.11  Moreover, when criminal 
defendants do challenge the scientific basis of the evidence against 
them, they nearly always lose.12 The reasons for this disparity are 
puzzling. Factual accuracy can hardly be less important in criminal 
trials.  The purpose of criminal proceedings is to correctly identify the 
perpetrator of the crime so that the perpetrator can be punished.13 Yet, 
while ostensibly using the same standards to evaluate scientific 
evidence (Daubert or Frye, depending on the jurisdiction), judges in 
criminal cases overwhelmingly circumvent their gatekeeping 
responsibilities.  A prime example of this phenomenon can be found in 
bite-mark testimony. 
The science behind bite-mark testimony is murky at best. The 
underlying theory, that a mark found on a dead victim can be traced to 
the dentition of the perpetrator, is dubious.  The uniqueness of human 
dentition is questionable, and there is little empirical support for such a 
proposition. Moreover, unlike dental casts of all the teeth,  skin injuries 
to dead victims tend to be fragmentary and diffuse.  The bite-marks 
consist at most of the anterior teeth, and usually not all of those teeth.14 
 
evidence; and when plaintiffs challenged civil defendants’ expert evidence, the defendants 
usually won, but when criminal defendants challenged prosecution evidence, they seldom won). 
 9 See, e.g., Haggerty v. Upjohn Co., 950 F. Supp. 1160, 1165 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (excluding 
testimony based on case reports because “they are no substitute for a scientifically designed and 
conducted inquiry”), aff’d 158 F.3d 588 (11th Cir. 1998); Shepard v. Barnard, 949 So. 2d 232 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (while ostensibly applying Frye to exclude plaintiff’s causation 
testimony, the court examined the scientific basis of the expert opinion); Bouley v. Windschilt, 
No. A06-2145, 2008 WL 73297 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2008) (upholding exclusion of expert 
testimony as unreliable); Coratti v. Wella Corp., 831 N.Y.S.2d 358 (2006) (examining basis of 
expert causation opinion and finding case reports scientifically unreliable). 
 10 See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, 05-4046, 2005 WL 3541045 
(E.D. La. Dec. 6, 2005) (refusing to allow expert cardiologist  to testify about any connection 
between vioxx and the decedent’s heart attack on defendant’s objection); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 401 F. Supp. 2d 565, 593 (E.D. La. 2005) (limiting plaintiff’s expert cardiologist to 
testifying about the decedent’s heart condition after an extensive Daubert hearing). 
 11 Interestingly, in both Daubert and Frye jurisdictions, the exception to this is DNA 
testimony, where courts appear to routinely examine validity.  See Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268 
(Fla. 1997) (scrutinizing each step of DNA evidence for its scientific validity under Frye). 
 12 See Risinger, supra note 8, at 99 (“[C]ivil defendants win their Daubert reliability 
challenges to plaintiffs’ proffers most of the time, and . . . criminal defendants virtually always 
lose their reliability challenges to government proffers.”). 
 13 See PAUL ROBERTS & ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 101 (2004) (discussing 
legal relevance and the importance of accuracy in criminal adjudication). 
 14 See C. Michael Bowers, The Scientific Status of Bitemark Comparisons, in SCIENCE IN THE 
LAW: FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES 246 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2002) (noting the “fragile 
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No population databases establish the frequency of bite-mark patterns. 
Nor is there any system of blind, external proficiency testing using 
realistic models. Error rates are unknown. The few tests that have been 
attempted demonstrate a disturbingly high level of false positives.15 
Remarkably, most of this questionable testimony is admitted 
without challenge.16  Perhaps this is because, despite the dubious 
science behind bite-mark expertise, it is a field replete with the 
trappings, if not the substance, of science. The testifying experts have 
advanced degrees, and often board certification.  They have two 
professional associations, with impressive names. They publish in their 
own professional journals.  They use the statistical product rule17 to 
come up with remote-sounding probability statements.  But those 
trappings do not make it science. 
Nevertheless, these trappings of science seem to be persuasive to 
lawyers, judges and juries.  In the few post-Daubert challenges to bite-
mark evidence, courts focused on the credentials of the experts and 
avoided the question of scientific foundations, predominantly by citing 
to legal precedent.  Courts frequently admit bite-mark testimony simply 
because other courts have done so.18  They find that it is “not novel”19 
 
foundation of minimally relevant empirical research” on which bite-mark testimony is based). 
 15 See C. Michael Bowers, Problem-Based Analysis of Bitemark Misidentifications: The Role 
of DNA, 159S FORENSIC SCI. INT’L S104, S107 (2006) (noting that bite-mark proficiency testing 
“shows a disturbingly high false-positive error rate”). 
 16 Keith A. Findlay, Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the 
Search for Trust, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 893, 931 (2008) (“[T]he defense bar as a whole is 
generally unprepared to utilize or challenge scientific evidence adequately.”).  The failure of 
defense counsel to object to bite-mark evidence is astounding, considering the shaky basis of such 
testimony. 
 17 The statistical product rule is frequently used in DNA testimony and is defined by Hans 
Zeisel and David Kaye as follows: 
When alleles occur independently at each locus . . . and across loci . . . the proportion 
of the population with a given genotype is the product of the proportion of each allele 
at each locus, times factors of two for heterozygous loci. 
HANS ZEISEL & DAVID KAYE, PROVE IT WITH FIGURES: EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW AND 
LITIGATION 322 (1997).  Note the requirement that the variables (alleles in this instance) be 
independent.  This is something that forensic odontologists have never been able to establish. 
 18 See, e.g., People v. Wright, No. 179564, 1999 WL 33446496 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 
1999) (remanding for reconsideration of whether it was an error to admit testimony of forensic 
odontologist in rape-murder in which bite marks were all that linked defendant to crime scene).  
The appellate court concluded that any error was harmless in light of bite-mark testimony being 
admissible in 35 states. 
 19 See, e.g., Verdict v. State, 868 S.W.2d 443, 447 (Ark. 1993) (no error in admitting bite-
mark testimony of Dr. West because “evidence on human bite marks is widely accepted by the 
courts”); Carter v. State, 766 N.E.2d 377, 280 (Ind. 2002) (admitting bite-mark testimony because 
“defendant does not argue that it has become less reliable” than it was in 1977 when Indiana first 
admitted bite-mark testimony); State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 114 (N.J. 1999) (finding 
bite-mark testimony in a capital case reliable because “thirty states considering such evidence 
have found it admissible”); State v. Blamer, No. 00CA07, 2001 WL 109130 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 
6, 2001) (holding, without analysis, that the challenged testimony was admissible); Seivewright v. 
State, 7 P.3d 24, 30 (Wyo. 2000) (holding it was no abuse of discretion for trial court to refuse to 
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or they let in this shaky testimony precisely because it is “not 
science.”20  One court, holding bite-mark testimony admissible, 
remarked that expert testimony is “often speculative” and left it at that.21  
This is a far cry from the exacting standards that the civil courts demand 
of expert evidence. 
Nor can the federal courts be counted on to mop up the mistakes of 
the state courts in habeas relief by finding trials fundamentally unfair or 
by finding ineffective assistance when defense counsel fails to retain its 
own experts or challenge the prosecution’s.  The federal courts are no 
more willing than the state courts to engage in any analysis of the 
scientific grounds for bite-mark testimony. 22 
This is not because the evidence has been overwhelmingly correct 
and has therefore withstood the test of time (as is often argued in 
fingerprint cases23).  A number of capital DNA exoneration cases have 
involved bite-mark testimony.  In State v. Krone,24 for example, a 
capital conviction involving expert testimony that the defendant was the 
source of a bite-mark found on the victim’s body, the defendant was 
later exonerated through DNA analysis.25  The cases of Roy Brown,26  
and Willie Jackson27 also involved bite-mark testimony and post-
conviction DNA exonerations.28  Subsequent DNA tests also starred in 
the release of Dan Young, Jr., after twelve years in jail following a trial 
for rape and murder in which a forensic dentist had testified that his bite 
matched the marks on the victim’s body.29  In Brewer, a DNA 
 
hold a Daubert hearing, “[g]iven the wide acceptance of bite mark identification testimony and 
[defendant’s] failure to present evidence challenging the methodology”). 
 20 See, e.g., Carter, 766 N.E.2d at 377 (admitting bite-mark testimony because it was not 
science). 
 21 State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253 (Tenn. 1994). 
 22 In a typical example, Kunco v. Att’y Gen. of Pa., 85 Fed. App’x 819 (3d Cir. 2003), where 
the petitioner claimed that admitting bite-mark testimony employing an ultraviolet light technique 
that even other odontologists had castigated as unreliable, unethical, and incredible, the court held 
that this was not enough to show the necessary violation of due process. 
 23 See, e.g., United States v. Joseph, No. CR. A. 99-238, 2001 WL 515213 (E.D. La. May 14, 
2001) (admitting fingerprint evidence because it had “proven to be a reliable science over decades 
of use”).  As Simon Cole points out, however, the “test of time” is not an appropriate validation 
mechanism for fingerprints either.  See Simon A. Cole, “Implicit Testing”: Can Casework 
Validate Forensic Techniques?, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 117, 125 n.43, 124-26 (2006) (discussing the 
fallacy of relying on the adversarial process to exposes latent fingerprint misattributions). 
 24 182 Ariz. 319 (1995). 
 25 Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic 
Identification Science, 309 SCI. 892, 893, 893 fig.2 (2005) (showing the bite-mark evidence 
exhibit from Krone). 
 26 People v. Brown, 618 N.Y.S.2d 188 (N.Y. County Ct. 1994), aff’d, 600 N.Y.S.2d 593 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1993). 
 27 Jackson v. Day, 121 F.3d 705 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 28 The stories behind these cases are presented more fully in Craig M. Cooley & Gabriel S. 
Oberfield, Increasing Forensic Evidence’s Reliability and Minimizing Wrongful Convictions: 
Applying Daubert Isn’t the Only Problem, 43 TULSA L. REV. 285, 358-59 (2007). 
 29 Steve Mills & Jeff Coen, 12 Years Behind Bars, Now Justice at Last, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 1, 
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exoneration case involving bite-mark testimony, the court ordered a 
new trial, but refused to vacate the defendant’s capital conviction.30  In 
yet another case involving charges that were ultimately dropped, the 
expert had testified that the only person who could have made the bite 
found on the victim was the defendant; that same defendant was 
subsequently exonerated by DNA analysis.31 
This Article argues that admitting expert evidence that has never 
been able to demonstrate its validity (and is thus irrelevant) into 
criminal cases tears a gaping hole in the fabric of a justice system that 
values accuracy in adjudication.  In Part II, this Article examines the 
science behind forensic expert bite-mark identification testimony.  It 
examines the espoused theory of forensic odontologists, the 
assumptions made and the data supporting the theory, and the 
methodology, to conclude that the evidence is simply not supported. 
Despite the apparent existence of many of the Daubert factors, a closer 
examination reveals that there is no substance to the claims that forensic 
odontology is a science.  Part III examines how post-Daubert courts 
have addressed the admissibility question and finds that despite the 
myriad weaknesses of the evidence, it is rarely challenged, and when it 
is challenged it is nearly always found to be admissible, and 
admissibility is almost always upheld on appeal.  This is not because the 
courts are actually examining whether the evidence could meet Daubert 
or Frye.  Instead, once the expert is qualified, courts  tend to simply cite 
to precedent, or declare that the evidence is not science, so it does not 
have to meet Daubert or Frye.32  At most, and infrequently, the courts 
glance at the Daubert factors, and check them off their list.  Part IV 
asserts that relying on the trappings of science rather than examining the 
basis for the expert’s assertions is a dereliction of judicial gate-keeping 
duties, whatever standard of admissibility the court uses.  It discusses 
the flaws underlying the notion that cross-examination and the 
presentation of contrary evidence will solve the problem. This article 
 
2005, at 1. 
 30 Brewer v. State, 819 So. 2d 1169 (Miss. 2002). In 2007, Brewer was finally released on 
bail pending retrial.  Not until 2008 was Brewer exonerated, following the databank identification 
and subsequent confession of another inmate.  For further details of this saga, see Cooley & 
Oberfield, supra note 28, at 358-59. 
 31 Otero v. Warwick, 614 N.W.2d 177, 178 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (negligence action against 
testifying prosecution expert); see also Cooley & Oberfield, supra note 28, at 300-01 (discussing 
the cases of Edmund Burke and Dale Morris, both involving bite-mark identifications of suspects 
against whom the charges ultimately had to be dropped because of conflicting DNA evidence). 
 32 This loophole should have been closed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Kumho Tire, 
but many courts persist in admitting expert testimony that cannot demonstrate its empirical 
validity as “nonscience.”  See D. Michael Risinger, Goodbye to All That, or a Fool’s Errand, By 
One of the Fools: How I Stopped Worrying About Court Responses to Handwriting Identification 
(And “Forensic Science” in General) and Learned to Love Misinterpretations of Kumho Tire v. 
Carmichael, 43 TULSA L. REV. 447, 460 (2008) (discussing the courts’ evasion of their 
gatekeeping duties in the context of handwriting analyses). 
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concludes that gate-keeping matters and offers some suggestions for 
implementing more rigorous gate-keeping in the criminal context.  It 
acknowledges that in order for the adversary system to work in criminal 
cases, defense lawyers must challenge questionable expertise, like bite-
mark evidence. But when they do, judges must do more than 
superficially examine credentials and cite to precedent before deciding 
on admissibility.  Expert evidence that has no empirical basis has no 
relevance to any issue before the court.  It cannot possibly help the jury 
to decide any disputed issue of fact. 
 
I.     DOES BITE-MARK TESTIMONY PASS DAUBERT (OR  FRYE) MUSTER? 
 
Interpreting Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which 
permits experts to testify “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue,”33 the Supreme Court in Daubert explained 
that the rule “clearly contemplates some degree of regulation of the 
subjects and theories about which an expert may testify” and placed 
judges squarely in the gate-keeping role.34 In response to Daubert and 
its progeny,35 Rule 702 was amended to require that expert testimony be 
based upon “sufficient facts or data,” be the “product of reliable 
principles and methods,” and that those principles and methods be 
reliably applied to the facts of the case.36  Although not defined by the 
rule, reliability, in a case involving scientific evidence, “will be based 
upon scientific validity.”37  To guide this inquiry, the Daubert Court 
outlined four non-definitive factors (explicitly not to be used as a 
checklist): whether the theory can be and has been tested; its error rate; 
whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; and 
whether it has met with general acceptance in the scientific 
community.38 
A superficial application of these factors might give a judge the 
impression that bite-mark testimony meets these standards. It has after 
all, a theory that perhaps might be testable: that bite-marks are uniquely 
 
 33 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 34 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). 
 35 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (noting that it applies to all expert 
testimony). 
 36 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 37 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. 
 38 Id. at 593.  The Court did far more than simply list factors; it explained why they were 
important and discussed their limitations in an attempt to get gatekeepers to actually think about 
the expertise they were letting in or keeping out.  For an article remarking upon the distressing 
habit of post-Daubert trial courts to use these factors as a “mechanical checklist, woodenly 
applied,” see Risinger, supra note 32, at 460. 
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identifying. The testifying experts claim that there are studies to support 
this theory. These studies are published in peer-reviewed publications 
put out by their professional associations.  The experts also claim a 
vanishingly small error rate (although they rarely explain what the error 
rate refers to).  Bite-mark identification testimony is generally accepted 
by forensic odontologists.  But any examination beneath the surface of 
these factors demonstrates the utter lack of science behind bite-mark 
testimony. 
Not all the states have adopted the amended Rule 702. Some states 
prefer the general acceptance standard first enunciated by Frye.39 But 
under either standard for scrutinizing expert testimony, the judge has the 
primary duty to decide whether the evidence is relevant.40  And 
evidence that is based on nothing more than the illusion of science and 
the ipse dixit of the expert cannot have any tendency to make a fact of 
consequence more or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence.41 
Simply put, bite-mark testimony cannot meet this standard. It has 
no empirical support.  None of the trappings of science, the scientific 
sounding titles,  group “certification” and publication in journals put out 
and reviewed by other members of the group, can serve to make bite-
mark evidence helpful in deciding the perpetrator’s identity unless the 
theory and assumptions on which the identification is based, the data 
supporting the theory, and the methodology used are sound.42  Bite-
mark testimony fails on each of these fronts: the theory is based on 
unsupportable assumptions, the data is absent and what we do have 
demonstrates the invalidity of the theory, and the methodology lacks 
professional guidelines or standards, and is entirely subjective.  Absent 
empirical support, the testimony can have no tendency to make a 
disputed issue of identity more or less probable. 
 
 39 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (excluding polygraph testimony in a 
criminal case).  Notably, the operative question in Frye is whether the testimony at issue has 
achieved general acceptance in the scientific community.  This standard is frequently misapplied 
in bite-mark evidence, where courts seem to believe that what counts is general acceptance by the 
courts.  See, e.g., State v. Swinton, 847 A.2d 921 (Conn. 2004) (citing other cases in upholding 
admissibility of bite-mark evidence); State v. Blamer, No. 00CA07, 2001 WL 109130 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Feb. 6, 2001) (holding that bite-mark evidence was admissible). 
 40 As the Daubert Court explained, the requirement that expert testimony assist the trier of 
fact “goes primarily to relevance.”  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. 
 41 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (“[N]othing in either Daubert or the 
Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to 
existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.”). 
 42 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 (requiring expert scientific testimony to be grounded in scientific 
method). 
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A.     What are These “Trappings of Science”? 
 
Qualifying a witness as an expert is generally the first step in 
determing whether expert testimony is admissible.  In the majority of 
bite-mark cases, it tends to be the only step courts engage in, and the 
courts usually find these experts qualified in their field.43 Most of the 
experts testifying about bite-mark identification (whether for the 
prosecution or defense) in criminal cases are dentists. In addition, most 
testifying experts are members of the American Board of Forensic 
Odontology (“ABFO”).  Another professional association that many 
bite-mark experts belong to is the American Society for Forensic 
Odontology. These organizations have publications, and the articles 
published in them are peer-reviewed. Some of the articles published 
attempt to perform studies of various kinds that are later cited by 
experts in testimony. 
So why is that not enough?  First, the theory that bite-marks are 
unique has never been adequately tested—and may be untestable—so 
rather than even attempting to support it with data, testifying experts 
simply assert that it is so.  Second, the few studies that have been 
attempted are so riddled with flaws that they cannot support the claims 
that their authors make, and would never be accepted into a mainstream 
scientific journal.  This is at least partly attributable to the fact that there 
is no formal academic post-graduate training in the U.S. in forensic 
odontology.  There is little funding for odontology research.44 
Third, the methodology employed by forensic odontologists in 
making bite-mark identifications is entirely subjective.  There are no 
objective standards by which to determine the minimal criteria for 
declaring a “match.”  ABFO attempted in 1984 to issue Guidelines to 
develop a scoring protocol that was supposed to achieve a reliable and 
objective method of quantifying similarities and differences between the 
marks and the questioned dentition.45  This was supposed to be a more 
scientific approach,46 but the authors soon retracted and advised “all 
 
 43 Even when serious questions about the experts’ credentials have arisen, such as in the case 
of Michael West, who was expelled from one professional association and asked to resign from 
another, and had been the subject of a critical expose on CNN, courts managed to find him 
qualified.  See Howard v. State, 945 So. 2d 326, 352 (Miss. 2006) (holding that there was no error 
in admitting Dr. West’s testimony since the court had previously admitted his testimony and 
remarking that “[j]ust because Dr. West has been wrong a lot does not mean, without something 
more, that he was wrong here”). 
 44 See Iain A. Pretty, The Barriers to Achieving an Evidence Base for Bitemark Analysis, 
159S FORENSIC SCI. INT’L S110, S119 (2006) (noting the absence of post-graduate programs in 
forensic odontology and the dearth of research funding). 
 45 Am Bd. of Forensic Odontology, Inc., Guidelines for Bite Mark Analysis, 112 J. AM. 
DENTAL ASS’N 383 (1986). 
 46 See Raymond D. Rawson et al., Reliability of the Scoring System of the American Board of 
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odontologists [to] await the results of further research” rather than rely 
on the Guidelines.47  The world is still waiting. 
 
B.     What is the Theory Underlying Bite-Mark Testimony? 
 
Bite-mark testimony is primarily offered by the prosecution as 
identification testimony.  Occasionally, it is also offered to demonstrate 
the heinousness of the crime.  While the latter use may be problematic 
with respect to whether the marks are actually bite-marks rather than 
bruises or abrasions, it is the first use, as identification evidence, that is 
the most troubling. 
Prosecutors presumably have turned to bite-mark testimony 
because they were not able to obtain the far more scientific DNA 
evidence from the crime scene, or because the DNA evidence was 
degraded, contaminated in some way, or (for some other reason) the test 
results were equivocal.  Typically, the prosecution expert purports to be 
able to identify the biter from the bruises left on the corpse of a victim 
(or, occasionally, from food left at the crime scene).48  The theory 
behind the testimony is that each person has a unique bite-mark, and 
that the biter can be identified from the marks left on the skin of a dead 
victim.49  This theory of uniqueness has grave underlying statistical and 
logical flaws, which have never been addressed by bite-mark experts.50  
Further, even if tooth morphology is a result of random processes (such 
as growth, disease, environmental insults, diet, etc.) rather than being 
genetically determined, coincidental matches between people may still 
be possible—a question that a database would be necessary to address.51 
 
Forensic Odontology for Human Bite Marks, 31 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1235, 1259 (1986) (praising the 
guidelines as “a truly scientific approach”). 
 47 Gerald L. Vale et al., Letter, Discussion of “Reliability of the Scoring System of the 
American Board of Forensic Odontology for Human Bite Marks,” 33 J. FORENSIC SCI. 20 (1988). 
 48 See, e.g., State v. Ortiz, 502 A.2d 400 (Conn. 1985) (finding admissible forensic 
odontologist’s testimony that defendant made the bites in apple found at crime scene); Banks v. 
State, 725 So. 2d 711, 716 (Miss. 1997) (expert witness matched the bite marks on a bologna 
sandwich left at the crime scene to the capital defendant’s dentition); Doyle v. State, 263 S.W.2d 
779 (Tex. Crim. App. 1954) (allowing identification of burglary suspect from bite-mark left in 
cheese at the crime scene); Seivewright v. State, 7 P.3d 24, 26 (Wyo. 2000) (comparing suspect’s 
dentition with marks left on cheese at crime scene). 
 49 See, e.g., State v. Sager, 600 S.W.2d 541, 561 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (substantiating the 
admissibility of bite-mark identification testimony through the use of forensic odontology to 
identify unknown victims through dental records). 
 50 For an explanation of the uniqueness fallacy, see Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, 
The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199, 204-05 
(2008) (explaining why it is a fallacy to assert that even snowflakes are unique simply because of 
the number of ways that water molecules can be arranged, and discussing the “faulty logic that 
equates infrequency with uniqueness”). 
 51 See David L. Faigman, Identification from Bitemarks, in SCIENCE IN THE LAW: FORENSIC 
SCIENCE ISSUES 256, 257 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2002) (discussing the study of identical 
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When asked about the foundation of bite-mark evidence, experts 
generally cite to the ability of forensic odontologists to identify victims 
of disaster or homicide.52  With this kind of identification, an unknown 
victim is examined, and the dental records of a known person are 
compared to the dentition of the victim.  A dentist armed with a full set 
of dental records can probably identify a corpse with a fair degree of 
certainty (although just how much certainty has never been studied, and 
is therefore still unknown).  Using this technique, the dentist examines 
the  (nominally) thirty-two teeth, with five surfaces each, making 160 
possible surfaces which can each contain specific characteristics, and 
any fillings, decay, lost teeth, and mis-positioning.  In addition, the 
forensic odontologist examines number, shape, type and placement of 
dental restorations, root morphology, bone patterns, and sinus 
morphology. Because each of these factors provides some individual 
characteristics, there is little controversy about the ability of a dentist to 
put them together to identify a dead person from a complete set of 
dental records, especially if there are anomalies in the teeth.53 
Thirty-two teeth are not used in bite-mark comparisons, however, 
since at most, four to eight teeth are visible in bite-marks.54  Unlike the 
identification of catastrophe victims from a full set of dental records, 
bite-mark identification consists of “matching” a mark on the victim 
with the anterior teeth of a suspect.  Bite-mark experts only look at 
marks that are essentially bruises on a victim, and compare them with a 
model (or tracing of a model) of the suspect’s teeth.55  So although the 
use of dental records in identifying catastrophe victims is often cited in 
validation, bite-mark comparison bears little resemblance to identifying 
an unknown victim using a complete set of dental records. 
The underlying theory for bite-mark comparisons thus depends on 
three assertions: first, that “the dental characteristics of anterior teeth 
involved in biting are unique among individuals;”56 second, that this 
“asserted uniqueness is transferred and recorded in the injury;”57  third, 
that human skin can maintain the accuracy of the marks over time, after 
 
twins). 
 52 See, e.g., People v. Mattox, 237 N.E.2d 845, 846 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (identifying homicide 
victim from dental records). 
 53 See Paul C. Giannelli, Bite Mark Analysis, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 5, 5 (2007) (discussing the 
difference between use of forensic odontology to identify the deceased and its use to identify 
suspects in homicide cases). 
 54 See Iain A. Pretty & David J. Sweet, The Scientific Basis for Human Bitemark Analyses—A 
Critical Review, 41 SCI. & JUST. 85, 89 (2001). 
 55 See Iain A. Pretty, Unresolved Issues in Bitemark Analysis, in BITEMARK EVIDENCE 554, 
557 (Robert B.J. Dorian ed., 2005) (discussing methods of comparison and the difference 
between dental identification and bite-mark comparison). 
 56 Id. at 557. 
 57 Id. 
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the death of the victim.58 
All three are highly questionable assertions.59  There is a great deal 
of controversy about the ability of forensic odontologists to identify 
marks left on a victim’s body as bite-marks at all.60 In one of the first 
bite-mark cases, People v. Marx,61 the court concluded that “there is no 
established science of identifying persons from bite marks as 
distinguished from, say, dental records and X-rays.”62  There is no 
evidence that things have changed in this regard. 
 
C.     What Data Support the Theory That Bite-Marks are Identifying? 
 
Testifying experts surmount the problems underlying the theory of 
uniqueness by simply assuming that the theory is valid.  Rather than 
offering data to support the theory of uniqueness, testifying experts 
simply state that bite-marks are unique.  Few empirical studies have 
even attempted to demonstrate the asserted uniqueness of bite-marks, 
and those few have critical flaws.63  One study attempting to compare 
bites of identical twins, and concluding that each was unique, was 
flawed by being extremely small (five sets of twins), and failing to set 
 
 58 Id. at 549-50 (discussing as “unresolved issues” the “highly viscoelastic” properties of 
human skin and citing studies demonstrating that “changes in bitemark appearance are likely to 
be greater as the injury grows older” in both living and dead victims). 
 59 See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 15, at S106 (2006) (castigating the linkage between injuries 
and a specific person as not being arrived at with scientific rigor and noting that the “dental 
literature . . . is surprisingly thin and sorely lacking in rigorous scientific testing”); Duane T. 
DeVore, Bite Marks for Identification?—A Preliminary Report, 11 MED. SCI. & L. 144 (1971) 
(questioning the accuracy of skin as a substrate for bite-mark impressions and the lack of a 
population database); Iain A. Pretty & Malcolm D. Turnbull, Lack of Dental Uniqueness Between 
Two Bite Mark Suspects, 46 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1487, 1487 (2001) (challenging the “central 
dogma” that human teeth are unique and that sufficient detail is rendered during biting to enable 
identification of the biter). 
 60 See, e.g., Ege v. Yukins, 380 F. Supp. 2d 852, 878 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (defense expert 
contended marks were the result of livor mortis rather than bite-marks), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 485 F.3d 364, 366 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that trial court’s admission of expert’s 
probability statement substantially prejudiced trial and that defense counsel’s failure to object 
constituted ineffective assistance); Kinney v. State, 868 S.W.2d 463, 464-65 (Ark. 1994) (battling 
experts disagreed about whether the marks were bite marks at all); State v. Duncan, 802 So. 2d 
533, 553 (La. 2001) (battling experts disagreed over whether marks were bites); Stubbs v. State, 
845 So. 2d 656, 668 (Miss. 2003) (same); Brewer v. State, 725 So. 2d 106, 116 (Miss. 1998) 
(same). 
 61 126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1975). 
 62 Id. at 353.  Remarkably enough, despite this concession, the testimony was admitted.  But 
in that case, the defendant had distinctive irregularities in his teeth, and the mark was in skin 
overlying cartilage on the victim’s nose, which resulted in one of the most distinct and deepest 
bite marks on record in human skin.  Id. at 354 (explaining that most bite marks are on softer 
tissue and not very deep). These conditions are rarely met, and yet courts routinely continue to 
admit bite-mark testimony, often citing Marx as precedent. 
 63 See Giannelli, supra note 53, at 4. 
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out a detailed methodology.64  Because much of the variation observed 
could have been caused by the technique used to produce the 
comparisons, its results are suspect.65  Moreover, whether the 
differences the study found in the twins’ dentition would be observed in 
a bite-mark was not addressed. 
Similarly flawed was a 1984 study attempting to apply a statistical 
probability theory to 397 bites chosen for their clarity, but without 
randomization.66  Again, details of methodology were omitted, and 
techniques were combined.67  Even worse, the study’s conclusions were 
based on the flawed premise that the position of each tooth was 
independent of the position of the others, an assumption that has been 
shown to be incorrect.68 
As noted above, armed with a full set of dental records (that is, 
records of all thirty-two teeth, present or absent, filled or broken) and a 
corpse, forensic odontologists have been able to identify catastrophic  
victims (usually from a finite list) with some degree of success.  
Whether the biting teeth are unique from person to person is the subject 
of a single study of fifty young adults.69  First, the design is flawed: it is 
far to small to establish what it purports to establish.  Moreover, the 
study examined only the question of whether “the occlusal surfaces of 
the upper and lower anterior teeth are specific to each individual” rather 
than the more salient question of “the probability of finding a 
sufficiently similar set of occlusal surfaces in a target population” which 
the authors acknowledge would require the development of a statistical 
database.70 Nor did the study suggest that the features of the anterior 
teeth would be transferred to a bitten surface.71  Or that the transfer 
would remain accurate over time. 
But even if there were support for the theory that each person’s 
mouthful of teeth is unique, that does not address the question of how 
unique are the marks made by those teeth.72  And of that question, no 
 
 64 Reidar F. Sognnaes, Raymond D. Rawson et al., Computer Comparison of Bitemark 
Patterns in Identical Twins, 105 J. AM. DENTAL ASS’N 449 (1982). 
 65 See Iain A. Pretty, The Barriers to Achieving an Evidence Base for Bitemark Analysis, 
159S FORENSIC SCI. INT’L S110 (2006) (noting flaws in twin study). 
 66 Raymond D. Rawson et al., Statistical Evidence for the Individuality of the Human 
Dentition, 29 J. FORENSIC SCI. 245 (1984). 
 67 See Pretty, supra note 44, at S115-16 (noting flaws in Rawson study). 
 68 See id. 
 69 Jules A. Kieser et al., The Uniqueness of the Human Anterior Dentition: A Geometric 
Morphometric Analysis, 52 J. FORENSIC SCI. 671 (2007).  Earlier studies attempting to 
demonstrate uniqueness had been fatally flawed.  One study failed to consider the registration of 
the features examined on human skin, and additionally concluded that it had not confirmed the 
uniqueness of the anterior teeth.  T.W. MacFarlane et al., Statistical Problems in Dental 
Identification, 14 J. FORENSIC SCI. SOC. 247-52 (1974). 
 70 Kieser, supra note 69, at 675. 
 71 Id. 
 72 See, e.g., DAVID J. BALDING, WEIGHT-OF-EVIDENCE FOR FORENSIC DNA PROFILES 54 
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systematic study has been made.  There is, however, anecdotal evidence 
that demonstrates just the opposite.73 
Although some bite-mark experts in criminal cases purport to 
quantify the chance of a coincidental match, they are doing so without 
an underlying database, which makes their numbers meaningless.74  The 
problem with using the product rule to determine the likelihood of 
coincidental match in bite-mark cases is that, unlike DNA testing, there 
is no supporting database.  Nor (again, unlike DNA evidence) is there 
any evidence that the factors being measured in bite-marks are 
independent, which is another requirement in using the product rule to 
determine the likelihood of coincidental matches.75 
Even if bite-marks were not unique, they might be useful in 
identification, as long as the frequency of a particular bite-mark were 
known.  For example, before the advent of DNA typing, blood groups 
were used as a fairly imprecise method of identification.76  If blood 
found at the crime scene was not the same blood group as that of the 
defendant, it would make it less likely that the defendant was there.  On 
the other hand, if the blood at the crime scene “matched” the type of the 
defendant, it did not mean very much, because it could also “match” 
many other people.77  But by making the unsupported assumption that 
 
(2005) (explaining that with respect to fingerprints, although “the suggestion that recorded 
fingerprints are unique has never been rigorously checked,” the question before the court is 
whether the imperfect impression taken from a crime scene is “enough to establish the defendant 
and nobody else could have left it”).  To answer that question one would need to know the 
frequency of those particular marks in the relevant population. 
 73 See, e.g., C. Michael Bowers, supra note 14 (demonstrating that two different people 
“matched” the same set of bite-marks); Bruce R. Rothwell, Bite Marks in Forensic Dentistry: A 
Review of Legal, Scientific Issues, 126 J. AM. DENTAL ASS’N 223, 230 (1995) (recounting the 
saga of the 1976 Milone murder trial, in which one defendant was convicted on the basis of bite-
mark testimony, someone else later confessed, and his teeth also “matched” the marks). 
 74 A similar problem in microscopic hair analysis caused the F.B.I. to reject it.  See ERICA 
BEECHER-MONAS, supra note 5, at 115 (discussing the F.B.I.’s acknowledgment that microscopic 
hair analysis cannot be used as the basis for personal identification).  In microscopic hair analysis 
testimony, experts often couch their conclusions in the form of a statistical likelihood so high that 
it suggests a very low probability of error.  For example, if the hairs match eight characteristics 
out of twenty-six, there is a 1-in-4500 chance that the same characteristics would be found to 
match if the hairs came from different individuals.  These are called Gaudette statistics.  Although 
this may sound impressive, even the progenitor of this method acknowledges its subjectivity.  See 
id.  The real question is, assuming a match, what is the probability that the unknown and known 
hairs came from the same person?  This question cannot be answered without knowing the size of 
the population from which the defendant came, something the Gaudette statistics cannot answer.  
The next most useful question is the probability of misinformation: Given a match, what is the 
probability that the crime scene hair came from someone other than the defendant?  The Gaudette 
statistics do not answer that question either. 
 75 See id. 
 76 See, e.g., WILSON J. WALL, GENETICS & DNA TECHNOLOGY: LEGAL ASPECTS 29-41 (2d 
ed. 2004) (discussing blood group identification and contrasting it with DNA profiling). 
 77 See, e.g., Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 2007) (finding that testimony that blood 
found at the crime scene matched the defendant’s blood group typing, which was found in 
approximately 1.9% of the population).  Notably, however, many of the DNA exonerations 
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bite-marks are unique, forensic odontologists give a specious illusion of 
accuracy. 
 
D.     What Data Support the Theory that Human Skin Registers Bites? 
 
The second postulate upon which the theory of bite-mark 
identification rests is that human skin can accurately register bites.  Two 
studies have attempted to demonstrate the validity of matching marks 
made on pigskin (which is said to be similar to human skin) to human 
dentition.  In the first of these studies, the percentage of incorrect 
identifications ranged from 24% under ideal laboratory conditions 
immediately after biting, to 91% incorrect identifications after 24 
hours.78 In a later study, matching dental casts to marks in pig skin, 
incorrect identifications ranged from 12% to 22%.79  With such a high 
error rate, the studies cannot purport to be measuring anything 
reliably.80 
Further complicating this issue is the tendency of living human 
skin to distort marks made upon it.  The third postulate of bite-mark 
identification theory requires that marks made upon the (presumably 
living) victim remain unchanged over time (and after death).  On its 
face, this assertion seems dubious.  Bite-marks are essentially bruising, 
blood tends to pool in various parts of the corpse (livor mortis), and 
human skin is highly malleable.81 Skin responds to trauma differently in 
 
involved faulty serology testimony.  See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 55, 82 (2008) (discussing the high percentage of faulty serology testimony involved in DNA 
exoneration cases). 
 78 David A. Whittaker, Some Laboratory Studies on the Accuracy of Bite Mark Comparison, 
25 INT’L DENTAL J. 166 (1975) (“[T]he inability of examiners to correctly identify bitemarks in 
skin . . . under ideal laboratory conditions and when examined immediately after biting suggests 
that under sometimes adverse conditions found in an actual forensic investigation it is unlikely 
that a greater degree of accuracy will be achieved.”). 
 79 Iain A. Pretty & David Sweet, Digital Bite Mark Overlays—An Analysis of Effectiveness, 
46 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1385, 1390 (2001) (concluding that this “[p]oor performance” has “very 
serious implications for the accused, the discipline, and society”). 
 80 Contrast these results with the requirements for statistical significance levels of p=0.05, or 
confidence intervals of 95%, without which judges routinely exclude expert testimony in toxic 
torts.  See, e.g., Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine, Inc., 482 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2007) (affirming 
exclusion of plaintiffs’ expert testimony in toxic tort action for failure to meet statistical 
significance levels); Vanderwerf v. SmithKlineBeecham Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (D. Kan. 
2008) (excluding plaintiff’s testimony of link between paxil and suicidal ideation).  These 
concepts of statistical significance are important in scientific studies because they reflect the 
scientific preference for false negatives over false positives, and therefore express the results of 
hypothesis testing as the chance of obtaining the observed data if the null hypothesis was correct.  
For an explanation of statistical significance, confidence intervals, and relative risk, see 
BEECHER-MONAS, supra note 5, at 60-62. 
 81 See, e.g., Ege v. Yukins, 380 F. Supp. 2d 852, 878 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (defense experts 
testified that the marks on victim were livor mortis rather than a bite-mark). 
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different people, and at different times.82  It is also highly elastic, so that 
it stretches when bitten and when evidence is collected.83 Any bite-mark 
on skin may be distorted.84 Areas with more underlying fat, or more 
prone to movement, are especially prone to distortion, and this may be 
compounded by the force of the bite.85  The older the bite, the more 
distortions can be expected.86  The inevitable distortions of a mark made 
on human skin are further compounded by movement of the victim’s 
body, before and after death.  Given the inevitability of distortions, 
comparisons of marks on skin with dentition are highly suspect. 
 
E.     Unsupported Assumptions Bolstered by Unfounded Certainty: The 
Illusion of Statistical Support for Expert Conclusions 
 
Forensic odontologists generally bolster their conclusions of a 
“match” with impressive sounding certainty.  The basis for this certainty 
originated in the statistical product rule.87  For example, in an early 
case, the Arizona Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of bite-mark 
testimony finding “that there is an eight in one million probability that 
the teeth marks found on the [victim] . . . were not those of the 
[defendant].”88 The expert based these figures on several points of 
comparison, citing two books and several articles employing the 
product rule for its use.89  Although this use was upheld on appeal, 
subsequent cases have made experts more leery of using quantitative 
assertions, or even attempting to explain the product rule.90 
 
 82 See DeVore, supra note 59 (noting distortions in human arm skin of live subjects). 
 83 See D. R. Sheasby & D. G. MacDonald, A Forensic Classification of Distortion in Human 
Bite Marks, 122 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 75 (2001) (noting that the same biter may leave differing 
marks on the same victim). 
 84 DeVore, supra note 59 (noting distortions in human arm skin of live subjects). 
 85 See J. C. Barbenel & J. H. Evans, Bite-Marks in the Skin—Mechanical Factors, 14 J. 
FORENSIC SCI. SOC. 235 (1974) (studying distortions during and after biting). 
 86 Id. 
 87 See, e.g., State v. Garrison, 585 P.2d 563 (Ariz. 1978) (upholding expert bite-mark 
testimony based on the product rule). 
 88 Id. at 566. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Professors Saks and Koehler give an elegant explanation of the product rule: 
According to the rule, the probability that each of a series of independent events will 
occur is given by the product of their unconditional probabilities.  Attempts to use the 
product rule to support individualization run into several problems.  First, proper 
application of the rule requires a set of reliable frequency estimates for the relevant set 
of forensic characteristics.  Second, the characteristics must be independent of each 
other.  Third, even if the first two problems are overcome, application of the product 
rule necessarily falls short of establishing unique individualization.  The product of 
probabilities greater than zero always yields a value greater than zero.  The 
probabilistic approach, therefore, always leads to the conclusion that a source other 
than the suspected individual or object might exist. 
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An example of this is found in  Ege v. Yukins,91 where the bite-
mark expert, having first opined that the defendant’s dentition was 
“highly consistent” with the marks on the victim, responded to the 
prosecutor’s question by answering that no one else in a city of 3.5 
million people (like Detroit, where the murder took place) would 
“match up.”92  Defense counsel did not object, instead proffering 
experts who opined that the marks were livor mortis rather than bite-
marks, and even if they were bite-marks, they did not match the 
defendant’s dentition.93 Although the prosecution expert’s figures were 
undoubtedly based on the product rule, the expert neither referred to it, 
nor explained it.  Because the expert’s probability statement was not 
supported by anything other than the size of the Detroit metropolitan 
area, where the murder took place, it was ultimately the basis for the 
Sixth Circuit’s grant of habeas.94 
The same prosecution expert who testified in Ege had testified 
previously in numerous cases, among them People v. Wright.95  There, 
the expert explicitly based his statistics on an article published in the 
Journal of Forensic Science,96 and opined that “if you have five unique 
points, . . . the chance of another individual making that same mark is 
4.1 billion to one” and concluding that no one in the world “would have 
this unique dentition.”97   
The article on which Dr. Warnick based his testimony, however, is 
deeply flawed; the study design and execution are faulty and the 
statistical assumptions unsupportable.98  In a nutshell, the author, using 
the product rule, and based on a determination that there were 150 
 
Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science 
Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199, 209 (2008). 
 91 485 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 92 Id. at 368. 
 93 Id. 
 94 See id. at 373 (finding that although Ege’s ineffective assistance claim for her counsel’s 
failure to object was time-barred, because “it should have been obvious . . . that the manner in 
which this physical evidence was presented was objectionable . . . we cannot say that it should 
have been similarly obvious to Ege that the substance of the physical evidence—at least as 
presented by Dr. Warnick—was complete bunk”).  The habeas writ was brought after the statute 
of limitations had expired, but the petitioner claimed that the statute had been tolled by the newly 
discovered evidence of a letter from the prosecutor’s office “concerning the unreliability of Dr. 
Warnick as an expert witness in two previous murder trials.”  Id. at 370.  Thus, while the Sixth 
Circuit agreed that the letter was newly discovered evidence with respect to the due process 
claims, it was not with respect to the ineffective assistance claims.  Id. 
 95 No. 179564, 1999 WL 33446496 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1999), rev’d, 625 N.W.2d 783 
(2001).  This is one of the two cases that the Sixth Circuit cited in Ege, 485 F.3d at 372, where 
the bite-mark expert “was totally unreliable—in one case, because DNA evidence later excluded 
the defendant as a possible suspect; in the other, because a second expert undermined Warnick’s 
probability determination.” 
 96 Rawson, supra note 66. 
 97 Wright, 1999 WL 33446496 at *3 (showing testimony of prosecution expert, Dr. Warnick). 
 98 See Pretty & Sweet, supra note 54, 89-90 (discussing errors in Rawson’s study). 
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possible positions for each tooth, found that the probability of finding 
two sets of six teeth each was 1.4 x 1013.  He assumed a world 
population of 4 billion, and stated that a match at five teeth would 
positively identify the biter to the exclusion of all others.  The 
fundamental problem with using the product rule in this manner is that 
it assumes that each position of each tooth is independent, an 
assumption that has been shown to be false.99  In addition, the article on 
which the expert based his testimony concerned the uniqueness of 
human dentition rather than the uniqueness of bite-marks, both of which 
have been criticized widely.100  Ultimately, Wright was reversed and 
remanded to the trial court for an admissibility hearing regarding the 
statistical probability statement, the conviction was vacated, and 
remanded for a new trial.101 
The more usual probability statements, however, are not 
quantified, but simply assert that the marks are “consistent”102 with 
defendant’s teeth; “positively match;”103 or that the expert has a 
“reasonable degree of dental certainty” that the defendant’s teeth made 
the marks.104  These formulations for conclusions reflect current 
professional advice to experts, such as that in a treatise on bite-mark 
evidence, acknowledging that “there is no quantitative base for bite-
marks analysis . . . [and] forensic dentists should refrain from such 
statistics.”105  Rather, in the next chapter, the text asserts that “human 
dentition is certainly unique; this has been established, although, as 
previously stated, not in a mathematically sound fashion.”106  Using 
words like “consistent” and “match” hardly solve the problem.  These 
statements depend entirely on the expert’s subjective assessment.107  
 
 99 See id. 
 100 See, e.g., Rothwell, supra note 73, at 229 (explaining that “there is no study of large 
populations to establish [the theory of uniqueness] firmly” and noting that there is “no conclusive 
demonstration of the distinctive nature of a single bite pattern”).  Notably, Dr. Warnick was sued 
for gross negligence by a murder suspect arrested for murder and later exonerated by DNA 
evidence.  Otero v. Warnick, 614 N.W.2d 177 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that there was no 
duty owed by the expert to the plaintiff).  Dr. Warnick had testified in a preliminary hearing that 
Otero was the only person in the world who could have made the marks found on the victim’s 
body.  Id. at 178.  When Otero was excluded as the source of DNA found on the victim’s body, 
after spending five months in jail, he was released. 
 101 People v. Wright, 463 Mich. 993 (2001). 
 102 See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 748 So. 2d 736 (Miss. 1999); Furtado v. State, No. 08-00-00230-
CR, 2001 WL 959437 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2001); State v. Arredondo, 674 N.W.2d 647, 660 
(Wisc. Ct. App. 2003). 
 103 See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 639 So. 2d 6, 9 (Fla. 1994). 
 104 See, e.g., State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 258 (Tenn. 1994). 
 105 Pretty, supra note 55, at 543. 
 106 Id. at 561. 
 107 See J. M. Kittelson et al., Weighing Evidence: Quantitative Measures of the Importance of 
Bitemark Evidence, 20 J. FORENSIC ODONTO-STOMATOLOGY 31, 36 (2002) (“[B]itemark 
evidence is inherently qualitative, and the use of quantitative measures to describe the importance 
of bitemark evidence would be misleading.”). 
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Crucially, they mask the absence of data for the experts’ unfounded 
assumptions about the uniqueness of bite-marks and the registration of 
these marks on the skin of the victim.  Without data, such assertions are 
meaningless. 
 
F.     Methodology 
 
Not only are the assertions of “match” subjective, but the 
methodology itself consists entirely of subjective comparisons.  There 
are no official standards, no guidelines, and no criteria.  The attempt of 
ABFO to achieve some methodological standardization was never 
implemented.108 Although a number of variations exist,109 the basic 
technique is comparing the marks made on the victim to a cast made of 
the defendant’s teeth.  Usually this is done by photographing the 
victim’s marks, sometimes after excision, or, if there are impressions 
left in the skin, making a mold from the impressions.  The defendant’s 
model is either compared to a life-size photograph of the victim’s 
marks, or a transparent overlay of the defendant’s model is compared to 
the victim’s marks. Dr. West, a forensic odontologist who practiced 
primarily in Mississippi, was wont to simply place the model onto the 
victim’s wounds.110 
At each step of the process, distortions may occur.  Photographs 
must be taken quickly, since “the clarity and shape of the mark may 
change in a relatively short time in both living and dead victims.”111  
Moreover, the position of the victim matters, because distortions will 
occur if photographed in a position other than the one in which the 
victim was bitten.112 In order to judge the scale, some point of reference 
must be included in the photograph of the victim’s marks.113 
When making overlays and tracings, errors often are introduced.114  
 
 108 See Bowers, supra note 15, at S106 (noting that ABFO’s attempt to achieve objective 
guidelines “failed, not surprisingly, due to inter-examiner discord and unreliable quantitative 
interpretation”). 
 109 See, e.g., Pretty & Sweet, supra note 54, at 90 (noting “the wide variety of techniques”). 
 110 See, e.g., Howard v. State, 945 So. 2d 326 (Miss. 2006). 
 111 Rothwell, supra note 73, at 226. 
 112 See, e.g., DeVore, supra note 59 (studying distortion of marks on living volunteers 
depending on the position of the volunteer during the photograph, and concluding that the degree 
of distortion was so great that only if the exact position of the body when bitten could be 
replicated should photographic images be used for comparison); Barbenel & Evans, supra note 85 
(studying distortions in bite marks in both living and dead victims). 
 113 See Mark L. Bernstein, Two Bite Mark Cases with Inadequate Scale References, 30 J. 
FORENSIC SCI. 958 (1985) (noting the inaccuracy of small plastic rulers used as reference scales). 
 114 See David Sweet & C. Michael Bowers, Accuracy of Bite Mark Overlays: A Comparison of 
Five Common Methods to Produce Exemplars from a Suspect’s Dentition, 43 J. FORENSIC SCI. 
362 (1998) (finding that hand-traced overlays were inaccurate and generally unsuitable for use, 
and that radiographic overlays were more accurate). 
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When comparing the photographs or tracings of the victim’s marks to 
the overlay or tracings of the suspect’s teeth model, errors can be 
introduced also.115  Moreover, even if more objective techniques are 
attempted, (by the use of radiographic overlays, for example) 
ultimately, the comparison of the photograph of a bite-mark to an 
overlay of the defendant’s dentition is a subjective process. 
When more precise methods have been attempted, they have been 
a dismal failure.  When computerized complex image analysis was 
attempted in order to provide greater objectivity, and tested against a 
real legal case, a different biter from the already convicted (on the basis 
of expert bite-mark testimony) defendant was identified.116  Either the 
defendant was wrongly convicted, or the computer was inaccurate, but 
the attempt at computerization was abandoned. 
Error rates appear to be high, although they have never been 
rigorously quantified. A study published in 1974 found that false 
positive identifications occurred 24% of the time.117  Proficiency testing 
was attempted by ABFO, which conducted four studies of its 
diplomates.118  In the first study, ABFO found that error rates were 
“unsatisfactorily high.”119  Two subsequent studies were never 
published.  The fourth reported an impressive sounding 85% successful 
match rate for the thirty-two diplomates analyzing four cases.120  
However, as Dr. Bowers points out in his critique, the poorest level 
achievable by this study was 71%.121  Thus, as Dr. Bowers 
demonstrates, the actual median false positive rate (that is, declaring a 
match for a non-biter) was 63.5% and the false negative error rate 
(declaring no match when, in fact, the biter had made the marks) was 
22%.122  This error rate, especially the false positive rate, is disturbingly 
high. 
 
 115 See Rothwell, supra note 73, at 230 (“In even the most careful process, each stage 
introduces errors.”). 
 116 See A.S. Naru & D. Sykes, Digital Image Cross-Correlation Technique for Bite Mark 
Investigations, 37 SCI. & JUST. 251 (1997) (observing that the skin may not record bites 
accurately enough to enable analysis). 
 117 Whittaker, supra note 78 (bite marks on porcine skin had a 24% false positive 
identification rate). 
 118 See Bowers, supra note 14, at 248-49 (discussing the four tests). 
 119 Id. at 248. 
 120 Kristopher L. Arheart & Iain A. Pretty, Results of the 4th ABFO Bitemark Workshop—
1999, 124 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 104-11 (2001). 
 121 Bowers, supra note 14, at 251, tbl.2 (explaining that if an examiner got one match wrong 
by linking it to an innocent suspect, he would still get the remaining five dentitions right by not 
erroneously matching them). 
 122 Id. 
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II.     WHAT ARE THE COURTS DOING? 
 
No one seriously contends that bite-mark testimony is based on 
“sufficient facts or data,” or that it is the “product of reliable [meaning 
scientifically valid] principles and methods,” reliably applied to the 
facts of the case.123  If examined in any but the most superficial manner, 
it is obvious that not one of the Daubert factors can be met: the theory 
that partial impressions of unique dentition can be made on the skin of 
now-dead victims and that the marks made can be traced back to the 
biter is wholly untested, and all indications are that it is not true. The 
few times it has been tested, its error rate has been extraordinarily high.  
There are some articles reflecting this research placed in journals that 
are specialized for the purposes of criminal litigation, such as the 
Journal of Forensic Science and Forensic Odontology, the Journal of 
Forensic Odonto-Somatology, and a very few in the American Journal 
of Dentistry, but none in mainstream scientific journals like Science, 
Nature, and the Lancet. 
No full-time academic graduate training exists for this specialty.  
There is little research, and no research is funded by major national 
granting agencies, such as the National Institute of Health. As for the 
field’s general acceptance in the scientific community, it depends on 
how you define the community.124  If the community is limited to 
people making their living testifying about bite-marks, it is a foregone 
conclusion that they will reach a consensus that it is “scientific.”125  It 
also depends on what the community in question must agree on. While 
testifying forensic odontologists may all agree on their assumptions 
about the uniqueness of human dentition and their own ability to 
“match” marks on the victim’s skin to a particular person’s dentition, 
there is simply no consensus (even among this limited group) about 
proper methodology.  Although ABFO has issued guidance on many 
aspects of bite-mark comparisons, it has never addressed the best 
comparison method to use.126  So how does this stuff get past the 
gatekeepers? 
 
 123 FED R. EVID. 702 (as amended Dec. 1, 2000). 
 124 See Beecher-Monas, supra note 5, at 8 (discussing the problem of defining the 
“community” so narrowly that a small cohort of testifying “experts” can agree that their 
testimony is valid without ever being subject to the scrutiny of the general scientific community). 
 125 Notably, a number of forensic odontologists have been outspoken in their criticism of the 
empirical basis of their profession.  See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 14; Kittelson et al., supra note 
107; Pretty & Sweet, supra note 54; Rothwell, supra note 73. 
 126 See Pretty & Sweet, supra note 54, at 91 (noting that a court would not be able to 
determine whether a bite-mark expert was using a generally accepted methodology by reviewing 
the literature). 
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A.     Failure to Challenge the Scientific Basis of Bite-Mark Evidence 
 
One of the huge flaws in the idea of judicial gate-keeping is its 
reliance on the adversary system to challenge suspect expert testimony. 
Many defense attorneys simply do not challenge the scientific basis of 
bite-mark evidence.127  This failure to challenge prosecution experts 
could be attributed to under funded and overworked public defenders’ 
offices.  It also could be attributed to the defense’s not being sufficiently 
informed.  Surprisingly, however, many attorneys do not even seek to 
obtain expert assistance for their clients.128  And when the defense does 
hire an expert, it is another forensic odontologist, who, for obvious 
reasons, is unwilling to expose his field as complete bunkum. For 
example, at the trial of Kennedy Brewer, who was later exonerated by 
DNA evidence, the defense stipulated “that there is a body of scientific 
knowledge which allows for the identification of individuals based upon 
bite mark examination on soft tissue.”129  Rather than challenge the 
science, the defense challenged the expert’s qualifications (the infamous 
Dr. West, who had by this time been suspended from ABFO).130  When 
 
 127 See, e.g., Ege v. Yukins, 485 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming in part and reversing in 
part the district court’s grant of habeas, finding that although bite-mark evidence is admissible, 
and therefore an objection would have been unavailing, the statistics used to declare a match 
should have been objected to); State v. Duncan, 802 So. 2d 533 (La. 2001) (affirming the 
exclusion of defendant’s photographic evidence of real victims’ actual bite marks where counsel 
introduced expert testimony that the marks in question were not caused by bites, but counsel did 
not challenge the scientific basis of bite-mark evidence); Walters v. State, 720 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 
1998) (no pre-trial motions seeking forensic odontologist); State v. Fortin, 917 A.2d 746 (N.J. 
2007) (remanding on signature crimes testimony; bite mark match testimony apparently 
unchallenged); Del Torro v. State, No. 04-99-00599-CR, 2001 WL 487996 (Tex. Ct. App. May 9, 
2001) (holding that it was not ineffective assistance to fail to request Daubert hearing); State v. 
Arredondo, 674 N.W.2d 647 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2003) (no ineffective assistance although defense 
counsel failed to challenge basis of match testimony). 
 128 See, e.g., Jackson v. Day, 121 F.3d 705 (5th Cir. 1997) (no attempt to obtain defense 
expert); Howard v. State, 945 So. 2d 326 (Miss. 2006) (defense counsel declined to hire expert); 
Walters, 720 So. 2d 856 (finding no ineffective assistance for failing to obtain a defense bite-
mark expert because the defense cross-examined the prosecution expert and “bite mark evidence 
was but one small bit of evidence identifying the defendant”). 
 129 Brewer v. State, 725 So. 2d 106 (Miss. 1998); 819 So. 2d 1169 (Miss. 2002) (remanding on 
newly discovered DNA evidence). 
 130 Brewer, 725 So. 2d at 125-26 (discussing West’s suspension and remarking that the 
“organizational difficulties” did not affect his qualifications).  In at least one case, habeas has 
been granted on the basis of the defense counsel’s deficient performance in failing to object.  See 
Ege v. Yukins, 380 F. Supp. 2d 852 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (finding that defendant was deprived of a 
fundamentally fair trial where the only evidence linking the defendant to the crime was the 
improperly admitted testimony of a forensic odontologist that a mark on the victim’s cheek was a 
human bite that matched the defendant’s dentition, and that out of 3.5 million people residing in 
the Detroit metropolitan area, the defendant was the only one whose dentition could match the 
mark).  In two cases involving the notorious Dr. Michael West (who claimed to be able to 
identify marks by shining a blue light on them, a technique no one else could replicate, and which 
caused his suspension from the American Board of Forensic Odontology, and resignation from 
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the defense proffered its own expert, Dr. Souviron, he testified that Dr. 
West (the prosecution expert) was “brilliant” and that Souviron used the 
“direct comparison” method himself.  The defense expert merely 
disagreed that the marks on the body (which was in “the early to 
moderate stages of decomposition”) were bite-marks at all.131  
In another such case, the evidence linking the defendant to the 
crime consisted primarily of two pieces of evidence: the defendant’s 
confession and the testimony of a forensic odontologist that marks 
found on the victim’s body “matched” the defendant’s bite.132  
Apparently, the defendant’s trial counsel failed to object to the 
prosecution’s forensic odontologist, and did not proffer any counter-
testimony.133  Thus, one-half of the significant evidence in the case went 
wholly unchallenged. After defendant’s conviction, the issues on appeal 
concerned the confession and the defendant’s fitness to stand trial (the 
defendant had an IQ of 56, could not count backward, tell which 
direction was east or where the sun came up), but not the bite-mark 
testimony.134  The habeas petition similarly omitted any reference to the 
bite-mark testimony. 
On appeal, when appellate lawyers bring ineffective assistance 
claims, they also tend to overlook the bite-mark evidence, and those that 
do bring claims on that basis are singularly unsuccessful.135  Leal v. 
 
the International Association of Identification), the challenges were not to the scientific validity 
of the testimony, but to the expert’s qualifications.  See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 748 So. 2d 736, 739 
(Miss. 1999) (holding that even though the defense made no objection to the bite-mark testimony 
at trial, “because of the controversial nature of bite-mark evidence,” the court took the 
opportunity to announce—without analysis—“that bite-mark identification evidence is admissible 
in Mississippi”); Brewer, 725 So. 2d at 125 (noting that although the defense challenged the 
expert’s qualifications, the defense and prosecution “stipulated that there is a body of scientific 
knowledge which allows for the identification of individuals based upon bite mark examination 
on soft tissue”).  For a discussion of the checkered history of Dr. West, as well as his continued 
use as a prosecution expert, see Paul C. Giannelli & Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutors, Ethics 
and Expert Witnesses, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1493, 1501-06 (2007) (“The reckless use of a tainted 
expert should be a due process violation.”). 
 131 Brewer, 725 So. 2d at 116, 126. 
 132 United States ex rel. Young v. Snider, No. 01 C 6027, 2001 WL 1298704 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 
25, 2001) (declining to issue writ of habeas), aff’d, Young v. Walls, 311 F.3d 846 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(upholding voluntariness of confession). 
 133 Snider, 2001 WL 1298704 at *2. 
 134 Young, 311 F.3d 846 (upholding refusal to issue writ of habeas corpus). 
 135 See, e.g., Jackson v. Day, 121 F.3d 705 (5th Cir. 1997) (reversing the district court’s 
holding that counsel’s failure to retain a forensic odontologist was ineffective assistance because 
although “this expert testimony would have aided the defense, it merely would have rebutted the 
testimony of the state’s expert”); Walters v. State, 720 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1998) (holding that no 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to obtain a defense bite-mark expert because the 
defense cross-examined the prosecution expert and “bite mark evidence was but one small bit of 
evidence identifying the defendant”); Del Torro v. State, No. 04-99-00599-CR, 2001 WL 487996 
(Tex. Ct. App. May 9, 2001) (finding that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek 
appointment of forensic odontologist to prepare for cross-examination and provide exculpatory 
testimony, failing to interview prosecution expert odontologist before trial, and failing to voir dire 
the prosecution expert). 
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Quarterman,136 a capital murder case involving prosecution bite-mark 
testimony, sought post-conviction relief twice, but without success.137  
Apparently, the defense had consulted an expert (another forensic 
odontologist) who agreed with the conclusion of the prosecution expert 
that the defendant’s bite matched the marks on the victim.138 
At the evidentiary hearing held in the state habeas action, the 
prosecution expert testified that he was sure “within a reasonable 
medical certainty” that the victim’s bite-marks were caused by the 
petitioner’s teeth.139  The defense expert (who was consulted, but did 
not testify at trial) did not contest the validity of the field of expertise, 
nor the qualifications of the prosecution’s expert, remarking instead that 
every dentist is qualified to render an opinion on bite-mark evidence,140 
illustrating the problem of having a small cadre of “experts” who all 
reinforce the appearance of science without ever having to explain its 
basis. 
In Howard v. State,141 the court held that there was no ineffective 
assistance of counsel despite the failure of the defendant’s lawyers to 
seek a defense odontologist; despite their failure to voir dire or cross-
examine the dental expert who prepared the molds of defendant’s teeth; 
and despite defense counsels’ failure to challenge the prosecution’s 
odontologist (the infamous Dr. West).142  In the direct appeal, the court 
had relied on the statements of defense counsel at sidebar that an expert, 
Dr. Richard Souviron, had been consulted, but the defense had decided 
not to call him because “his prediction was that he would probably 
concur” with Dr. West.143 
 
 136 No. SA-07-CA-214-RF, 2007 WL 4521519 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2007). 
 137 Leal v. Dretke, No. Civ. SA-99-CA-1301-RF, 2004 WL 2603736 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 
2004) (denying habeas); Quarterman, 2007 WL 45251519 (denying habeas based on 
International Court of Justice violation, but granting certificate of appealability). 
 138 Dretke, 2004 WL 2603736.  
 139 Id. at *13. 
 140 Id. 
 141 945 So. 2d 326 (Miss. 2006).  The trial was complicated by the defendant’s taking over his 
own case pro se because it had taken two and a half years to get to trial.  Id.  The original lawyers 
were directed to act as stand-by attorneys.  Predictably enough, the defendant was convicted.  Id. 
 142 More than twelve years ago Mark Hanson ran an exposé of West’s testimony in the ABA 
Journal.  See Mark Hanson, Out of the Blue, 82 A.B.A. J. 50 (Feb. 1996) (discussing the 
numerous cases in which West has testified on everything from bite marks to bleach stains and 
the complete lack of scientific evidence for any of the testimony).  In several of the cases in 
which he testified about matching bite marks, DNA evidence from the victim has later excluded 
the convicted defendant.  Id.  This exposé did not, however, appear to have slowed West’s 
testimonial exploits.  He was the prosecution expert in Brewer v. State, 819 So. 2d 1169 (Miss. 
2002), in which DNA found on the victim’s body and tested after the conviction excluded the 
defendant as the source.  See Shaila Dewan, Despite DNA Result, Prosecutor Retries a ‘92 Rape-
Murder Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2007, at A1 (discussing the capital murder trial and 
subsequent DNA test showing that the semen in the victim’s body was not the defendant’s, and 
noting that despite this apparent exoneration, the prosecution had decided to retry the defendant). 
 143 Howard, 945 So. 2d at 349 (emphasis omitted). 
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In his petition for post-conviction relief, however, the defendant 
proffered an affidavit from Dr. Souviron, which demonstrated that the 
defense counsel had misled the trial court, since Dr. Souviron stated that 
by the time of trial he had already disagreed in two cases with Dr. West, 
and in addition, because the victim’s body had decomposed for five 
days, was exhumed and un-embalmed, it would be difficult to know if 
the marks were bite-marks at all.144 Moreover, Dr. Souviron averred 
that, had he been retained, he could have guided the defense voir dire of 
the prosecution expert, because “Dr. West’s statements during voir dire 
were either half true or misleading” regarding “his expulsion from 
ABFO, the American Academy of Forensic Sciences and the 
International Association of Identification” and regarding West’s 
testimony in three prior cases where “the pattern injuries that were 
interpreted as bite marks by Dr. West were not bite marks.”145  
Although the affidavits and other documents proffered by the petitioner 
“point out how many times Dr. West has been proven wrong and they 
discuss how unscientific his methods are” that was not enough for the 
court to provide relief.146  The court, in denying the petition, found that 
petitioner “has not proven prejudice to his defense” and remarked that 
“[j]ust because Dr. West has been wrong a lot, does not mean, without 
something more, that he was wrong here.”147 
In a partial exception to the failure of most courts to find 
ineffective assistance for failing to object to bite-mark testimony, the 
Sixth Circuit granted habeas, in Ege v. Yukins,148 finding a violation of 
due process because trial counsel did not to object to the 3.5 million to 
one odds given by the state’s witness, Dr. Warnick.149 In the course of 
its rather convoluted opinion, the Sixth Circuit took pains to explain that 
“[b]ite mark evidence may by its very nature be overly prejudicial and 
unreliable, but it may nevertheless be admitted under Michigan 
evidence law, and we do not question the Michigan courts’ judgment 
with respect to admission of the bite mark evidence standing alone.”150 
The court offers no explanation of how evidence that “by its very 
nature” may be “overly prejudicial and unreliable” can hope to meet due 
process standards of fundamental fairness. 
The only physical evidence in this case linking the defendant to the 
crime was the purported bite-mark on the victim’s cheek.151  The initial 
autopsy report concluded the marks to be livor mortis.  The victim’s 
 
 144 Id. at 350. 
 145 Id. at 351 (emphasis omitted). 
 146 Id. at 352. 
 147 Id. 
 148 485 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 149 Id. at 376. 
 150 Id. (footnote omitted). 
 151 Id. at 367. 
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body was exhumed, nine years after the murder, but it was too badly 
decomposed to be able to assess the marks. Dr. Warnick, relying on the 
original autopsy photographs, concluded that the marks were bites, and 
testified at trial that the marks matched the defendant’s dentition to the 
exclusion of anyone else in the Detroit metropolitan area.152 
Subsequent to Ege’s conviction, the Sixth Circuit noted that Dr. 
Warnick’s expert testimony was “found to be in essence a sham by a 
party on whose behalf the testimony was given”153—the Wayne County 
prosecutors’ office. 154  Because the letter merely flagged the 
unreliability of bite-mark testimony, however, the Sixth Circuit found 
that Ege’s “free-standing ineffective assistance claim—that her counsel 
blundered in not objecting to Dr. Warnick’s bite mark evidence”  was 
time-barred.155 
On the other hand, the defendant’s due process claim was based on 
the adequacy of the physical evidence presented against her. Because 
the court could not say that it should have been obvious to Ege “that the 
substance of the physical evidence–at least as presented by Dr. 
Warnick–was complete bunk” she was permitted to bring that claim.156 
Her due process claim was founded on the improper admission of the 
state’s bite-mark testimony, which she claimed was “both substantively 
and probabilistically unsound.”157 
The Sixth Circuit found that there was no foundation for 
connecting the bite-mark to the defendant’s dentition or for the 
probability statement.158  However, because at trial the defense 
presented evidence that the marks were not bites at all, the Sixth Circuit 
held that the impact of the testimony was diffused so that any error was 
harmless.  The probability statement, however, was not diffused 
because the defense experts did not directly rebut it.  Therefore, defense 
counsel’s failure to object to the probability statement at trial was 
“objectively unreasonable” and presenting defense experts did not 
insulate counsel’s performance.159  Thus, the Sixth Circuit upheld the 
admissibility of bite-mark evidence while overturning only the 
 
 152 Id. at 368. 
 153 Id. at 374. 
 154 In this letter, the Chief of Operations of the Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office explained 
that Dr. Warnick’s testimony in two cases had been totally unreliable.  Id. at 372.  In one case the 
defendant later had been excluded by DNA evidence, and in the other a second expert 
undermined his probability statement.  Id.  As a result, the county would not approve warrants 
“where the main evidence as to the identity of a potential defendant is the opinion of Dr. Warnick 
that he/she is the source of the bite marks.”  Id. 
 155 Id. at 373. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 374. 
 158 Id. at 374-75. 
 159 Id. at 379 (finding that Ege had met “both the nested cause and nested prejudice prongs” 
for ineffective assistance). 
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quantitative probability statement given in conclusion. 
 
B.     Admitting Bite-Mark Testimony Because Other Courts Have  
 
When defense counsel do challenge bite-mark testimony, they are 
rarely successful.  Courts simply decline to engage in any serious 
analysis of these challenges. By far the most widely used gate-keeping 
avoidance technique that judges employ is admitting bite-mark evidence 
because other courts have done so.160  Rather than engage in any 
analysis of the scientific principles on which the testimony is based, the 
data underlying the testimony, the methodology, error rate, or general 
acceptance by the scientific community, these courts skirt the entire 
issue by finding neither a Daubert nor a Frye hearing necessary because  
other courts have previously admitted the testimony (also without such 
hearings).  For example, the court in People v. Moreno,161 held bite-
mark evidence to have been properly admitted despite the absence of a 
Frye hearing, because courts had been admitting this type of evidence 
for more than fifty years.162 
The court in State v. Swinton163 mentioned Daubert in passing. 
However, it found that bite-mark evidence was neither unreliable nor 
controversial, citing (pre-Daubert) cases rather than examining the 
scientific basis for the testimony.164  The court was more concerned 
about the computer-enhanced methodology used in the comparison (the 
prosecution’s expert used the soft-ware programs Lucis and Adobe 
 
 160 See, e.g., Calhoun v. State, 932 So. 2d 923, 925 (Ala. Ct. App. 2005) (finding bite-mark 
testimony admissible because it has “received evidentiary acceptance in nineteen jurisdictions” 
and “[n]o jurisdiction has rejected the admission of such evidence”); State v. Swinton, 847 A.2d 
921 (Conn. 2004) (citing cases finding bite-mark testimony admissible); People v. Lester, No. 
2004-198274-FH, 2006 WL 3421799 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2006) (finding bite-mark 
testimony admissible in Michigan without a “Daubert/Frye hearing” because it is generally 
accepted); Stubbs v. State, 845 So. 2d 656 (Miss. 2003) (holding that bite-mark testimony is 
admissible in Mississippi, citing cases); State v. Blamer, No. 00CA07, 2001 WL 109130 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2001) (citing Rule 702 and Daubert without analysis, stating “it is clear” that 
expert’s testimony was qualified and citing other cases that found bite-mark testimony 
admissible); Seivewright v. State, 7 P.3d 24 (Wyo. 2000) (finding bite-mark testimony admissible 
in a burglary prosecution without a Daubert hearing because courts have widely accepted it).  
This phenomenon does not appear to be limited to bite-mark testimony.  It also appears to be a 
common occurrence in handwriting testimony.  See Risinger, supra note 32, at 468 (noting the 
string-citing of courts of appeals decisions as authority for the generic admissibility of 
handwriting expertise). 
 161 No. 1023104, 2003 WL 22132196 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2003). 
 162 Id. at *6.  Moreover, even if the trial court had abused its discretion in not holding a Frye 
hearing, the appellate court found the testimony to be harmless error in light of other evidence in 
the case.  Id. at *7. 
 163 847 A.2d 921 (Conn. 2004). 
 164 See id. at 933 n.14 (disagreeing with appellant’s contention that bite-mark evidence was 
unreliable and controversial). 
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Photoshop, but did not create the Photoshop images himself), rather 
than scientific grounds.165  Because the prosecution’s bite-mark expert 
could not answer questions about how Photoshop worked, the court 
concluded that it was error to admit the Photoshopped images, but 
ultimately harmless, because the expert had concluded that there was a 
match even before seeing the images.166 
 
C.     The “It Is Not Novel” Approach 
 
Another way that courts grandfather the admissibility of bite-mark 
evidence is the “it’s not novel” approach.  This strategy permits the 
judge to avoid gate-keeping because these courts assert that only novel 
scientific evidence requires scrutiny.167  This was the approach of the 
Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Hodgson,168 which found that 
neither Frye nor Daubert applied to bite-mark testimony because it was 
“satisfied that basic bite-mark analysis by a recognized expert is not a 
novel or emerging type of scientific evidence.”169 
Such an approach not only ignores the cursory approach to 
evaluation taken by the earlier cases, but it also misconstrues the nature 
of scientific evidence.  Just because courts made prior errors in 
admitting bite-mark evidence does not seem to be a particularly good 
reason to continue doing so, nor does it appear to be a very thoughtful 
approach to the problem.  Moreover, even if the prior analyses had been 
sound, that is no guarantee that new information has not undermined the 
validity of the technique.  These judges completely miss the changing 
nature of scientific information.  New data may well demonstrate the 
fallacy of old assumptions. 
 
 
 165 Id. at 954-55.  The court disposed of the constitutional Confrontation Clause problem by 
finding that the defendant’s expert had himself used Photoshop images to demonstrate the 
inadequacies of the prosecution expert’s conclusion and thus had a “meaningful opportunity to 
probe the reliability of [the prosecution’s expert’s] identification testimony.”  Id. at 955. 
 166 Id. at 952, 957-58.  In addition, the defense expert made what appears in retrospect to have 
been a huge blunder.  To demonstrate the fallacy of prosecution expert’s assertions regarding time 
of the bite in relation to the time of the victim’s death, he used the molds of defendant’s teeth to 
make a mark on his own arm, which the prosecution expert used to demonstrate to the jury what 
he considered to be the unique features of the dentition and how similar the marks were to those 
on the victim’s breast.  Id. at 958. 
 167 See, e.g., People v. Quaderer, No. 242721, 2003 WL 22801204, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 
25, 2003), appeal denied, 680 N.W.2d 899 (2004) (affirming child abuse conviction despite the 
absence of a Frye hearing because such a hearing is required only if the scientific principles are 
new); State v. Hodgson, 512 N.W.2d 95, 98 (Minn. 1994) (testimony connecting mark on 
defendant’s arm to victim’s teeth was not a novel type of scientific evidence). 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
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D.     The “It’s Not Science” Circumventing Gambit 
 
Even when courts acknowledge that some level of scrutiny is 
required for scientific evidence, they may avoid gate-keeping by finding 
that bite-mark evidence is not scientific.  While Kumho Tire should 
have retired that particular gambit by explaining that gate-keeping 
requirements apply to all expertise, not just what the courts were calling 
“hard” science,170 courts continue to permit bite-mark evidence in 
without scrutiny because it is not science.  In Carter v. State,171 for 
example, the court cited its own 1977 precedent for the proposition that 
bite-mark evidence was reliable, and then held that because such 
evidence was “simply a matter of comparison,” it did not fall within the 
aegis of “scientific principles.”172  Nor did the court think there was any 
danger that the jury had “overestimated the value of the bite mark 
evidence,” since it “was highly probative to rebut the defendant’s 
contention that he was not a participant in the beating or murder of the 
victim but was merely present.”173  The court seems to have entirely 
missed the point that evidence without any empirical basis–whether or 
not it wishes to call it scientific–cannot be probative of anything. 
The notion that “physical comparisons” are “not subject to the 
stringent standards applied to scientific tests” was similarly voiced by 
the Alabama Court of Appeals, in Calhoun v. State.174  The court does 
not address the question of why the testimony of two prosecution 
experts was necessary to proclaim a match, if the jury could simply 
observe the marks and come to its own conclusions. Rather, the court 
cited bite-mark testimony’s “evidentiary acceptance in nineteen 
jurisdictions” and noted that Florida had similarly decided that “the jury 
is able to see the comparison for itself.”175  This reasoning ignores the 
question fundamental to the relevance of bite-mark testimony: how 
likely the perceived physical similarity would be, had someone other 
than the defendant made the mark (a question that cannot be answered 
without a population database).  Nor does the court address the 
distortions and subjectivity inherent in the models and photographs it 
believes that the jury can see for itself. 
Acknowledging that bite-mark testimony could not meet Daubert 
standards, the Oklahoma solution was to exclude expert “match” 
 
 170 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-48 (1999). 
 171 766 N.E.2d 377 (Ind. 2002). 
 172 Id. at 380-81. 
 173 Id. at 381-82. 
 174 932 So. 2d 923, 952 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005). 
 175 Id. at 952-53 (quoting Bundy v. State, 455 So. 2d 330, 349 (Fla. 1984), and rejecting the 
application of Frye’s general acceptance standard to bite-mark testimony). 
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testimony, while permitting expert testimony just short of that.176  For 
example, in a capital murder trial, expert testimony was admissible that 
photographs taken of the defendant’s right arm showed a “‘probable 
bite-mark’, which means, ‘the pattern strongly suggests or supports 
origin from teeth, but could conceivably be caused by something 
else.’”177  Despite the defense claims that such testimony was irrelevant 
because there was no connection made between the marks and the 
victim, the court nevertheless found it circumstantially relevant; not to 
the identity of the murderer, but to whether the defense had concocted 
the story he told the police that his brother had hit him before the 
murder.178  Why or how that incident was connected to the murder the 
court does not explain, although the court stated that the marks could be 
relevant to malice aforethought. 
Garrison is a troubling case. It was not tried until twelve years 
after the murder, and the only physical evidence linking the defendant 
to the murder were a piece of wire (that prosecution experts could not 
be sure came from a spool owned by the defendant) and a photograph of 
the contested marks on the defendant’s arm. The defense challenged the 
prosecution’s expert testimony and requested a Daubert hearing.  
Although the defense expert had to have transplant surgery shortly 
before the hearing, the judge would not postpone the hearing, and so the 
hearing proceeded without any defense expert.179  At trial, the defense 
and prosecution experts disagreed over whether the mark was a bite at 
all.180 On appeal, the defense claimed ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel for (among other things) failing to call an expert to testify at the 
Daubert hearing regarding the admissibility of the bite-mark 
testimony.181 This reasoning completely misses the point of gatekeeping 
requirements and evades the appellate court’s responsibility to monitor 
the trial court’s adherence to these standards. 
The court of appeals held that failing to produce an expert at the 
Daubert hearing was not ineffective assistance, even if it would have 
been beneficial, since the defense’s bite-mark expert ultimately did 
testify at trial.182  Nor did the court of appeals find that failing to grant a 
continuance for the hearing so that the defense expert could attend was 
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge.183 
 
 176 See Garrison v. State, 103 P.3d 590, 603-06 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Crider v. State 
ex rel. Dist. Ct. of Okla. County, 29 P.3d 577 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001)). 
 177 Id. at 603. 
 178 Id. at 596-604 (referring to the defendant’s conversation with police, regarding charges that 
he had filed against his brother for assault nine days before the murder). 
 179 Id. at 613-14. 
 180 Id. at 596. 
 181 Id. at 612. 
 182 Id. at 614. 
 183 Id. at 619.  But see id. at 619-20 (finding, however, that there was ineffective assistance 
regarding the mitigation phase of the capital proceedings, and thus remanding for resentencing). 
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E.     Absence of Meaningful Review 
 
The circumventing gambits of the lower courts would not be such a 
huge problem if there were meaningful review of their decisions.  There 
is not. For one thing, the abuse of discretion standard gives reviewing 
courts ample opportunity to unthinkingly affirm the admissibility 
decision.  For another, the courts are rightly reluctant to second-guess 
the credibility determinations made by the lower court. 
Taking their review responsibilities seriously, however, does not 
entail either unthinking affirmance or appellate credibility 
evaluations.184  Instead, it requires examining the process that the judge 
used to reach the admissibility determination.185  Failure to follow the 
legally prescribed approach to admissibility determinations is not 
discretionary.186 If the process was reasonably designed to discover 
whether there was a rational basis for the expert’s testimony, then it 
should be upheld.187  That is not, however, what is happening with bite-
mark testimony.  As noted above, the courts of appeals just uphold its 
admissibility based on precedent, its lack of novelty, or its unscientific 
basis. 
Federal courts are also unwilling to step into the fray. Because 
habeas claims must be based on a violation of federal statute or 
constitutional law,188 claims about the improper admission of bite-mark 
testimony tend to be based either on ineffective assistance of counsel 
(for failing to hire an expert, develop evidence, or make objections), 
sufficiency of the evidence, or due process/fundamental fairness.  The 
 
 184 See Kumho Tires Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 158-59 (Scalia, J., concurring) (Justice 
Scalia, joined by Justices O’Connor and Thomas, wrote: “I join the opinion of the Court, which 
makes clear that the discretion it endorses—trial-court discretion in choosing the manner of 
testing expert reliability—is not discretion to abandon the gatekeeping function.  I think it worth 
adding that it is not discretion to perform the function inadequately.  Rather, it is discretion to 
choose among reasonable means of excluding expertise that is fausse and science that is junky.  
Though, as the Court makes clear today, the Daubert factors are not holy writ, in a particular case 
the failure to apply one or another of them may be unreasonable, and hence an abuse of 
discretion.”). 
 185 See, e.g., Michael J. Saks, The Legal and Scientific Evaluation of Forensic Science 
(Especially Fingerprint Expert Testimony), 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1167, 1183 (2003) 
(delineating the post-Daubert courts’ failures to grapple with the scientific validity of fingerprint 
expertise and noting that “[t]hree concurring Justices in Kumho Tire anticipated such evasions, 
and suggested that they were likely to constitute an abuse of discretion”). 
 186 See Risinger, supra note 32, at 461 n.55 (noting that if a court violates the mandates of 
Kumho Tire, the appellate court should reverse and remand for a new determination absent 
harmless error). 
 187 See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 (explaining that the standard applies to the question of 
how to decide reliability as well as the decision on admissibility). 
 188 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993) (claims of innocence based on newly 
discovered evidence are not grounds for federal habeas relief absent independent constitutional 
violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding). 
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admissibility of evidence in state courts is generally held to be a matter 
of state law.189 
Thus, in Milone, when the petitioner claimed that the bite-mark 
evidence that had been used to convict him was unreliable under both 
Frye and Daubert, the Seventh Circuit held that because neither opinion 
purports to set a constitutional floor, the question would have to be 
“whether the probative value of the state’s evidence was so greatly 
outweighed by its prejudice to Milone that its admission denied him a 
fundamentally fair trial.”190  Even though the petitioner’s claim was that 
the bite-mark actually was made (and the murder committed) by 
someone else—a serial murderer who had confessed to the crime (and 
then hanged himself in his cell)—the court held that the bite-mark 
testimony did not deny him a fundamentally fair trial.191  He had 
presented his own experts in court, and had cross-examined the 
prosecution experts.  As for sufficiency,192 there was opportunity, a link 
to the murder weapon, proximity, and—the bite-mark.193 
Although the question before the court in Thomas v. Beard194 was 
whether admitting unreliable evidence (bite-mark testimony) violated 
the petitioner’s right to a fair trial, the court turned to state court 
precedent to determine whether bite-mark evidence was reliable.195  
Rather than examine the processes the state courts had engaged in to 
determine reliability, the federal court just cited to precedent, noting 
that “Pennsylvania courts have specifically allowed the use of bite-mark 
evidence, and provided there is adequate foundation for the testimony, 
such evidence is not per se fundamentally flawed.”196  That, of course, 
was precisely the petitioner’s claim, that the evidence was 
fundamentally flawed. Rather than address that claim, the court turned 
to whether counsel had been ineffective in failing to present defense 
expert testimony on the bite-mark issue.197  Because defense counsel 
had raised the issue of reliability in cross-examination and questioned 
the qualifications of the prosecution expert and the substance of his 
 
 189 See Milone v. Camp, 22 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[A] federal court can issue a writ 
of habeas corpus on the basis of a state court evidentiary ruling only when that ruling violated the 
defendant’s right to due process by denying him a fundamentally fair trial.”). 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. (opining, without analysis, that “certainly there is some probative value to comparing an 
accused’s dentition to bite marks found on the victim”). 
 192 A federal court reviewing a state court conviction for sufficiency must determine “whether, 
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond reasonable a doubt.  Id. at 703 
(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). 
 193 Milone, 22 F.3d at 703. 
 194 388 F. Supp. 2d 489 (E. D. Pa. 2005). 
 195 Id. at 527. 
 196 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Henry, 569 A.2d 929, 934 (Pa. 1990), a pre-Daubert 
decision). 
 197 Id. 
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testimony, the court found counsel’s performance “adequate.”198  Thus, 
no constitutional rights had been violated. 
Raising claims of false testimony does not appear to be any more 
successful as a strategy.  For example, in Spence v. Johnson,199 the Fifth 
Circuit declined to characterize defense challenges to the prosecution’s 
expert testimony as claiming false testimony.  Rather, the court viewed 
claims of unreliability, backed up by the expert’s misidentification of 
another woman and critiques of the expert’s methodology and 
conclusions as going to the weight of the evidence, and as having been 
fully litigated in the state courts.200  Moreover, “critically,” according to 
the court, the defense expert (another forensic odontologist) had 
testified at trial that he could not rule out the defendant’s teeth as a 
source of the bite marks.201  This case and Thomas perfectly illustrate 
the conundrum of the defense: challenges to the entire field are undercut 
by presenting an expert in that same field; on the other hand, without a 
testifying defense expert, it is difficult to demonstrate the dissension in 
the field.  Further, the approaches of both courts neatly ignore the crux 
of the matter: in Thomas, whether the whole field is so unreliable that a 
trial based on such evidence is fundamentally unfair; and in Spence, that 
an expert need not be lying to be testifying falsely.  Testifying to 
nonsense, even nonsense the expert believes, is testifying falsely. 
 
III.     RELEVANCE REDUX: WHAT COURTS SHOULD DO 
 
The commitment to a rational system of evidence entails the 
exclusion of irrelevant information.202  If experts cannot demonstrate 
that their field of expertise has an empirical basis, whatever opinion the 
expert may have reached is irrelevant. It has no tendency to make any 
fact in issue more or less probable. 
Relevance is the threshold criterion for admissibility. Even 
scholars arguing for “free proof” acknowledge the importance of 
screening information to ensure that it has some tendency to make a 
disputed issue in the case more or less probable.203  As Roberts and 
Zuckerman explain the concept, “relevance, like physical presence and 
pregnancy, conforms to the concept of the excluded middle.”204  There 
 
 198 Id. 
 199 80 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 200 Id. at 1000 (distinguishing Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988)). 
 201 Id. 
 202 See William Twining, The Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship, in RETHINKING 
EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 35 (1990) (discussing the rationalist tradition). 
 203 See, e.g., Michael S. Pardo, On Misshapen Stones and Criminal Law’s Epistemology, 86 
TEX. L. REV. 347 (2007) (book review). 
 204 ROBERTS & ZUCKERMAN, supra note 13, at 99. 
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is no shade of gray here. Something is relevant or not, in relation to a 
disputed issue—here whether the accused can be linked to the victim 
through marks on the victim’s body.  Unless there is an empirical basis 
for the assertion that a link can be made, any assertion about a link is 
meaningless. It cannot make the link more or less probable. This legal 
test is basic to rationality.  If something is not logically probative, no 
rational system of evidence should consider it. 
The reason for admitting only relevant evidence is the danger that 
irrelevancies may be mistaken as bearing on the question at hand, and 
this may make the ultimate decision unfounded and inaccurate (or, if 
accurate, only by chance).  Such evidence is affirmatively misleading. If 
the input is wrong, no reasoning process can be expected to make 
correct inferences.205  Although inaccuracy is a possible factor in any 
evidence, not just expert testimony, baseless expert testimony is 
particularly pernicious because the entire reason it is being admitted is 
that the jury lacks the background knowledge necessary to evaluate it.206  
So do judges, but judges at least have the benefit of training in critical 
thinking, guidelines for the evaluation of scientific testimony, repeat 
exposure, and a measure of accountability.207 
Moreover, there are good reasons to exclude irrelevant information 
from the decision process.  Although irrelevant information should be 
disregarded in making a judgment, studies show that presenting 
decision makers with both irrelevant and relevant information leads to 
less accurate decisions than if only relevant information were 
presented.208  Some of the pioneering work on this effect, known as the 
dilution effect, demonstrated that people responded differently to stories 
with the same relevant information if some were also presented with 
irrelevant information.  For example, in making diagnoses, medical 
students made more accurate diagnoses when they were presented with 
only relevant information than if they were also given extraneous 
information.209  Irrelevant information that ought to be ignored has a 
 
 205 See Alvin I. Goldman, Simple Heuristics and Legal Evidence, 2 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 
215, 219 (2003) (explaining that even deductive reasoning requires true premises in order to reach 
true conclusions). 
 206 See Mark P. Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert Reliability: How 
the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 15 (2003) (Daubert 
implies a view that misleading expert evidence is worse—and less amenable to correction through 
cross-examination—than misleading lay testimony). 
 207 See BEECHER-MONAS, supra note 5, at 33-35 (discussing why judicial gatekeeping has 
more potential for reaching accurate conclusions about expert testimony than simply admitting 
the evidence subject to cross-examination). 
 208 See Robyn M. Dawes, Behavioral Decision Making and Judgment, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 497, 537 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) (citing studies 
explaining that exposure to uninformative information can influence decisions). 
 209 See Philip E. Tetlock et al., The Dilution Effect: Judgmental Bias, Conversational 
Convention, or a Bit of Both?, 26 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 915, 916 (1996) (“[L]inking diagnostic 
with nondiagnostic evidence produced more regressive predictions than people would otherwise 
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way of creeping into, and skewing the decision.210 
For example, when people are asked to decide whether someone 
has a particular characteristic (such as aggression), irrelevant 
information (such as the physical attractiveness of the person in 
question) tends to obscure what is relevant, making for inaccurate 
decisions.211  This may be due to the fact that people listen for details 
around which they can construct stories that comport with their views 
about how the world works.212  Even irrelevant information can go into 
constructing these stories. 
This danger is particularly salient when the irrelevant information 
plays into commonly held stereotypes. Jurors’ prior experiences filter 
and order their expectations.213  The story model of jury decision-
making also helps to explain the importance of basing judgments on 
accurate information.  This model posits that juries weave stories from 
the testimony at trial that fit with their pre-existing views about how the 
world works.214  One of these pre-existing views is the collective 
mythology that a suspect can be identified from marks left behind at the 
crime scene.215  Thus, any story that includes the identification of the 
 
have made.”). 
 210 See Dawes, supra note 208, at 532 (“Dilution effects occur when evidence that does not 
distinguish between hypotheses in fact influences people to change their mind.” (emphasis 
removed)). 
 211 Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on 
Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 679 (2001) (discussing leniency shift 
toward attractive defendants). 
 212 See, e.g., J. RICHARD EISER & J. VAN DER PLIGT, ATTITUDES AND DECISIONS 100 (1988) 
(“[A]ccuracy declines considerably when the number of features or the number of alternatives 
increases.  [And] reliability with which choice rules are used tends to decrease as the decision-
maker’s information load increases.”). 
 213 See Shari S. Diamond, How Jurors Deal with Expert Testimony and How Judges Can 
Help, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 47, 51 (2007) (observing from a series of empirical studies that the “jury is 
not a blank slate that merely absorbs trial evidence and instructions”). 
 214 See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making, 
51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 242, 243-45 (1986) (positing a model in which jurors use 
their preconceptions to create a story from the evidence they heard at trial, take the jury 
instructions and create verdict alternatives, and attempt to find the best correlation between the 
story and the verdict alternatives). 
 215 See Simon A. Cole, Where the Rubber Meets the Road: Thinking About Expert Evidence as 
Expert Testimony, 52 VILL. L. REV. 803, 836 (2007) (noting that, with respect to latent fingerprint 
evidence, the “power of the testimony derives from the talismanic power of the word 
‘fingerprint,’ rather than from any articulation of the probative value of the evidence,” and 
concluding that “the cultural mythos is so strong and so deep that even judicial control over 
testimony may be incapable of overcoming it”).  Professor Cole asserts that courts and scholars 
have focused too much on admissibility and too little on the over-claiming that is characteristic of 
forensic expert testimony. Id. at 838-39.  The kind of expert over-claiming that Professor Cole 
has identified in latent fingerprint testimony is also common in bite-mark testimony, judging from 
the published opinions.  However, in forensic odontology, where there is a professional 
association with all the trappings of scientific endeavors, the problem is not only a lack of 
professional standards (the ABFO Guidelines are not mandatory), but the absence of any basis for 
them. 
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defendant as the perpetrator will be enormously influential.216 
When it comes to expert testimony, relevance must be considered 
in tandem with reliability.217  Daubert and amended Rule 702 both 
stress reliability of expert testimony as a facet of relevance, and 
therefore of admissibility.218  Another way of expressing this notion of 
reliability is through the concept of warrant, which depends on how 
well the testimony is supported.219  The task is to distinguish well 
supported from poorly supported evidence.  This requires some 
judgment. With lay testimony, a judge can assess whether, if true, the 
testimony would have any tendency to make an issue in the case more 
or less true.220  But with expert testimony, this requires another step.  
The reason for this is that unlike the opinions of lay witnesses, which 
must be “rationally based on the perception of the witness,”221 expert 
witnesses testify on “scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge.”222  In order to qualify as “knowledge” rather than rank 
speculation, the proponent of the evidence must demonstrate warrant.  
The problem is that warrant—unlike admissibility—is not an all or 
nothing proposition.223 
Just as relevance must be considered in relation to some issue in 
the case, warrant (reliability) must be considered in relation to the 
claims that are being made for the evidence.  For example, 
epidemiology studies are almost never perfectly analogous to a 
particular tort case being tried, having generally been done on some 
cohort that differs in some respects from the plaintiff, but they may still 
be sufficiently relevant and reliable to be admissible.  The theory behind 
epidemiology is demonstrably sound, and as long as the tests have been 
 
 216 See, e.g., Saks & Koehler, supra note 50, at 202 (noting that “[p]opular television 
programs . . . reinforce the notion of individualization in the collective public imagination by 
offering confident pronouncements from scientists” and questioning the ability of forensic science 
to deliver on such claims). 
 217 Justice Blackmun explained that reliability for admissibility purposes is different from 
what scientists call reliability (which he defined as getting “consistent results”) in that for legal 
purposes, reliability means scientific validity (which he defined as “the principle supports what it 
purports to show” and “trustworthiness”).  Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 
590 n.9 (1993). 
 218 Id. at 589 (finding that courts should screen expert evidence for relevance and reliability); 
FED. R. EVID. 702 (noting that to be admissible, expert testimony must be based on sufficient data 
and reliable methods). 
 219 See, e.g., Susan Haack, Of Truth, in Science and Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 985, 997 (2008) 
(explaining the epistemic term “warrant”). 
 220 Trustworthiness is also a concern with some types of lay testimony, which is why the 
Federal Rules exclude hearsay.  See FED. R. EVID. 802 (a) (“Hearsay is not admissible . . . .”).  
Where indicia of trustworthiness exist, the rules make exceptions.  FED. R. EVID. 802(b). 
 221 FED. R. EVID. 701(a). 
 222 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 223 See Susan Haack, Not Cynicism but Synechism: Lessons from Classical Pragmatism, 41 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOC’Y 239, 240 (2005) (arguing that while 
admissibility is categorical, reliability is continuous). 
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properly performed with the requisite controls, and correctly statistically 
analyzed with outcomes similar to the harm suffered by the plaintiff, the 
imperfect reliability of the studies should not keep the testimony from 
being admissible.  For the epidemiology example, the problem is one of 
extrapolation.224 
In the case of bite-mark testimony, however, the theory of unique 
dentition has never been demonstrated, nor has the empirical 
determination that two different items (a mark on the victim and a mold 
of the dentition of the suspect) contain sufficient detail to substantiate a 
match, there are no controls, and the statistics employed are complete 
balderdash.  Thus, while reliability may be a continuum, bite-mark 
identification testimony fails to reach even the extreme low end.  Bite-
mark testimony cannot even meet threshold relevance requirements for 
admissibility. 
Indeed, as the Habers have pointed out with respect to fingerprint 
evidence, even the preliminary foundations necessary before one can 
begin to evaluate the empirical basis necessary for the technique’s 
relevance have yet to be done.225  For one thing, before the accuracy of 
the methodology can be assessed, the proponents of the technique must 
be able to establish an official protocol, or agreed description of the 
method.226  As noted above, bite-mark specialists have yet to 
accomplish even this preliminary step. Once the protocol has been 
adopted by general consensus, the profession “needs to write and then 
adopt a report form that examiners complete that shows that each step is 
followed.”227  This step is necessary to ensure the reliability (i.e., 
replicability) of the method, and whether the practitioner has adhered to 
each of its steps. Formal training in the protocol, and an assessment of 
how well the practioner is following are also important, so that “it can 
be determined whether individual trainees or working examiners have 
learned and use the steps of the method correctly.”228  Finally, before 
the validity of the methodology can be evaluated, the profession must 
establish proficiency tests reflecting the difficulty of normal casework, 
and measuring performance during each step of the technique. Without 
such a preliminary foundation, which bite-mark experts have yet to lay, 
there is really no way to evaluate their claims to expertise. 
 
 224 See ZEISEL & KAYE, supra note 17. 
 225 See Lynn Haber & Ralph N. Haber, Scientific Validation of Fingerprint Evidence Under 
Daubert, 7 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 87, 88 (2008) (“[T]he ACE-V method [for fingerprint 
identification] has not been tested for validity, and until the necessary work is performed to 
quantify the method and ensure that examiners are using the method correctly and consistently, 
the method cannot be validated.”). 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. at 93 (explaining the importance of documenting the steps the expert took to reach a 
conclusion). 
 228 Id. at 94 (discussing the importance of setting specific goals and assessment of whether the 
goals were met by the practitioner). 
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While reliability may be a continuum rather than categorical, at 
some point in the continuum, there is simply not enough support for a 
proposition to be relevant to any issue in the case. In popular parlance, 
there is no “there” there.  That is precisely the problem for forensic 
odontology. While it may be logically defensible to admit testimony 
(subject to cross-examination) that has a solid scientific foundation, but 
has questionable application to the case at hand, that is not the situation 
with bite-mark identification testimony.  When a forensic scientist 
offers testimony that a particular bite-mark is unique without any data to 
support that assertion, it simply cannot be warranted.229 
Because determining relevance and reliability require the exercise 
of judgment, judges frequently punt on this issue, sending the evidence 
to the jury for its weight.230  It is sheer nonsense—and a dereliction of 
gate-keeping responsibilities—to say, as courts are wont to do, that the 
flaws of bite-mark testimony go to its weight rather than its 
admissibility.  First, admitting expert testimony in the first place implies 
that the court has found the testimony relevant and reliable—the jury 
knows that relevance is a basis for exclusion.  Second, it is the 
proponent’s obligation to substantiate the basis for admissibility, and 
admitting unreliable expert testimony transfers responsibility for 
demonstrating unreliability (in a criminal trial) onto the defense.231  
Third, conflicting accounts about what counts as science tend to divert 
the jury from the question that primarily concerns them (in criminal 
cases, whether this evidence demonstrates the defendant’s guilt). 
When experts come to different conclusions, even though both 
experts base their conclusions on solid science, that goes to weight.  
Even scientists with integrity, whose work is based on solid research, 
can reach different conclusions, drawing different inferences from the 
available evidence.  But that is not the situation with bite-mark 
testimony.  If expert conclusions, like those of bite-mark experts, are 
based on the illusion of science without its substance, that “expertise” 
should be excluded. Without an empircal basis, expert testimony simply 
has no place in court.  It has no tendency to make the identification of 
the perpetrator—the disputed issue of fact to which the evidence is 
related—any more or less probable, and is therefore irrelevant. 
 
 229 Cf. David L. Faigman, Judges as “Amateur Scientists,” 86 B.U. L. REV. 1207, 1224 (2006) 
(characterizing forensic identification evidence as “possibly the biggest embarrassment to the 
legal profession at this time” because “[u]nlike scientists who often make inferential leaps from 
general research to particular cases, forensic experts generally do not have any general data at 
all[, making them] . . . . essentially technicians who apply a technology built upon general 
statistical models that do not exist”). 
 230 See Gary Edmond, Specialised Knowledge, the Exclusionary Discretions and Reliability: 
Reassessing Incriminating Expert Opinion Evidence, 31 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 1 (2008) (using 
the example of facial mapping testimony in Australia). 
 231 See id. at 28. 
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Although cross-examination and the presentation of contradictory 
expert testimony are the traditional cures for “attacking shaky but 
admissible evidence,”232 expert testimony that lacks any empirical 
foundation is resistant to this kind of correction.  The reason for this 
phenomenon is that without data the assumptions made by the expert 
sound perfectly plausible.  As Justice Learned Hand (over a century 
ago) expressed the jury’s dilemma with respect to expert testimony, 
“how can the jury judge between two statements each founded upon an 
experience confessedly foreign to their own?”233 
For example, in mock jury studies about the effectiveness of cross-
examination, it apparently made little difference whether the defense 
challenged the expert testimony; whether the defense pointed out in 
cross examination that the expert’s conclusions were inconsistent with 
prior research and that the expert had not followed standard 
methodology; whether the defense not only cross-examined the 
prosecution expert, but also put on its own expert.234  Although the 
jurors discussed the expert evidence in their deliberations, and although 
there was a strong correlation between the prosecution expert’s 
testimony and the jury’s verdict preferences, the results did not vary 
among the first three conditions.  This illustrates the fallibility of 
expecting cross-examination to expose the flaws in bite-mark testimony. 
On the other hand, when an expert acknowledges a high error rate 
before announcing a conclusion, it does appear to make a difference. In 
a fourth condition, where the prosecution expert acknowledged that 
there was a sixty-six percent error rate in the methodology, but 
nonetheless opined a conclusion supporting the prosecution, there was a 
significant reduction in verdicts favoring the prosecution.235  
Unfortunately, no such acknowledgment has been forthcoming from 
bite-mark experts, who testify with certainty and without 
acknowledging error rates. 
Empirical studies of jury decision making also demonstrate that 
when decision makers are unable to evaluate the expert testimony, they 
resort to cues, defer to expertise, and accept the most prestigious 
source.236  When there is a battle of the experts, one expert may appear 
 
 232 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (“Vigorous cross-
examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are 
the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”). 
 233 Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 
HARV. L. REV. 40, 54 (1902). 
 234 See Joseph Sanders, The Merits of the Paternalistic Justifications for Restrictions on the 
Admissibility of Expert Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881, 936 (2003) (discussing the 
experimental work of Shari Diamond, et al., and concluding that “rulings excluding unreliable 
evidence promote jury accuracy even if we assume jurors are as good as judges in assessing 
reliability”). 
 235 Id. at 933. 
 236 See Diamond, supra note 213, at 56.  Professor Diamond suggests that judges permit jurors 
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more credible for reasons that have little to do with the scientific 
validity of the testimony.237 
If, as the story model of juror decision making suggests, jurors 
decide cases by selecting the competing story that best fits their notions 
of plausibility,238 scientific evidence that is embedded in the narrative 
may make the story seem more plausible than is warranted.239  When 
one expert testifies that based on the marks found on the victim’s body, 
and the model of the defendant’s bite, there is a match, that is pretty 
persuasive story telling.  Far more persuasive, for example, than the 
story is that we simply cannot tell what made those marks, or—if 
anyone—who made them. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The use of good science is a crucial component of justice.  It is an 
important facet of justice for the litigants in the criminal justice system, 
it is important to the rationality of the judges’ role and it is important in  
jury reasoning towards an accurate verdict. It is intellectually 
indefensible, and even cynical to continue admitting as expert testimony 
evidence that has not been able to demonstrate its empirical basis.  
Dressing the evidence in the trappings of science does not make it 
scientific.  Science is not magic; it is the hard, painstaking work of 
careful research.  Unless forensic odontologists are willing to engage in 
that empirical endeavor, they can have no knowledge to impart to the 
fact-finder, and their testimony should not enter a courtroom.  For at 
least a decade now, judges have known that they are responsible for 
keeping junk science out of the courtroom.  Yet, circumventing their 
gate-keeping responsibilities, judges continue to admit bite-mark 
testimony into evidence. 
Part of this is the fault of the defense for failing to challenge the 
evidence.240  Under-resourced and overworked public defenders, 
 
to ask questions of the experts, and notes that when such questions are permitted, many questions 
focused on alternative explanations for expert observations.  Id. at 58. 
 237 See Goldman, supra note 205, at 221 (“[O]ne expert’s greater surface credibility than his 
opponent may be the subjectively best cue available for choosing between them, but surface 
credibility might be a notably unreliable cue.”). 
 238 See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The 
Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 520 (1991). 
 239 See Gary Edmond, Science, Law and Narrative: Helping the ‘Facts’ to Speak for 
Themselves, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 555, 579 (1999) (noting that when “embedded in a narrative, 
especially if considered legitimately scientific, [evidence] may heavily influence the perception of 
the plausibility of particular aspects of a narrative and possibly the entire narrative”). 
 240 See, e.g., Risinger, supra note 8, at 135 (noting an “apparent systematic failure to seriously 
litigate these issues on the part of the criminal defense bar” particularly with regard to bite-mark 
evidence, where between 1993 and 1999, in only four or five of the forty-eight cases in the study 
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however, have little incentive to devote time and energy to a battle that 
has been lost in almost every case where it has been attempted.  Without 
a judiciary willing to take its gate-keeping role seriously, there is little 
point in making fruitless objections. 
Moreover, unless the appellate courts are also willing to take their 
review duties seriously, there is little prospect for change.  The abuse of 
discretion standard of review for trial court evidentiary decisions, made 
explicitly applicable to expert testimony admissibility decisions in 
Joiner,241 gives trial court judges a great deal of leeway in making bite-
mark admissibility decisions.  This standard does not give unlimited 
leeway, however, and certainly not the kind of leeway that courts 
reviewing bite-mark admissibility have been giving. Any serious review 
of courts’ strategems to avoid serious evaluation of the methodology 
could not but find that the courts holding bite-mark testimony 
admissible had  failed to engage in the process set out by the federal 
rules and Daubert, and thus had abused their discretion. 
The empirical inquiry envisioned by the Daubert trio and the 
amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 has simply been discarded 
in favor of categorical admissibility by relying on precedent. Early cases 
in which no reliability inquiry was performed have become precedent 
for admissibility decisions in perpetuity, so that courts never have to 
address the underlying issues.  This is exacerbated because in the 
criminal context, the only cases that are appealed are those in which the 
prosecution evidence was admitted, and the defendant was convicted, 
which tends to skew the appellate decisions in the direction of affirming 
admittance.242  While habeas courts could put a stop to this by finding 
the admissibility of such flagrantly bogus expertise a violation of 
fundamental fairness, only Ege has done this, and then only for the 
quantification opinion, rather than for the bite-mark identification. 
The lower courts have the tools to make proper validity 
assessments.  The Daubert trilogy and the amendment to Rule 702 have 
been implemented routinely and (for the most part) well in the civil 
context.  The appellate courts could find that trial courts refusing to 
employ these tools of analysis—or employing them in a “wooden”243 
fashion—have abused their discretion. And habeas courts could find 
that state systems that admit evidence without any empirical foundation 
 
was there “any indication that that the foundational reliability of such evidence was challenged”).  
In the period from January 2000 through August 2008, of the forty-six bite-mark identification 
cases I found, there were seven foundational reliability challenges, but none that were successful. 
 241 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142-43 (1997). 
 242 See Risinger, supra note 32, at 469 (noting the problem of skewed appellate decisions in 
the context of criminal handwriting cases). 
 243 Id. at 460 (noting the mechanical way in which Daubert is applied in handwriting cases); 
see also Saks, supra note 185, at 1171 (noting that in post-Daubert fingerprint cases, “the number 
of cases in which the courts conscientiously applied Daubert and Kumho Tire [was] zero”). 
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in a criminal case have violated precepts of fundamental fairness. 
It does take some intellectual effort. But lawyers and judges are 
trained in critical thinking.  Admitting testimony into evidence that has 
no empirical basis violates every precept of logic, rule of evidence, and 
notion of fundamental fairness.  To continue to admit such testimony 
just because it has been admitted in the past defies reason.  Failing to 
demand that the proponents of this evidence demonstrate its validity 
defies justice. 
